

The Hidden Wealth of English Dynasties, 1892-2016

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Abstract

Using individual level records of all wealth-at-death in England, 1892-1992, together with new estimates of the wealth-specific rate-of-return on wealth, I estimate a plausible minimum level of the amount of inherited wealth that is hidden. Elites conceal around 35% of their inheritance. Among dynasties, this hidden wealth, independent of declared wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013-6, house values in 1999, and Oxbridge attendance, 1990-2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates about 28%, at minimum, of the observed decline of the top 1% wealth-share, at the dynastic level, over the past century. I find 9,077 dynasties that are hiding £8.9 Billion.

JEL: N00, N33, N34, D31, H26

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I Introduction

In England the wealth-share of the top 1% declined from over 75%, in 1900, to less than 20% by 1970, resulting in a ‘Great Equalization’. This stylized fact is based entirely upon *observed* wealth-at-death. However, the incentive to hide wealth increased exponentially over the same period, peaking in the 1950s, when the top marginal rate of estate tax was around 80%. Is the ‘Great Equalization’ real? Or is it a misrepresentation based upon the changing character of elite wealth-at-death portfolios?

Declared wealth-at-death data is the primary source for our understanding of the 20th century wealth distribution in England.¹ Since 1858, the individual details of wealth-at-death have been centrally recorded in the *Principal Probate Registry Calendars*. Using a 100% sample of this data, 1892-1992, this paper details a method to estimate hidden wealth.²

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¹Atkinson and Harrison, *Distribution*; Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison, ‘Trends’; Atkinson, ‘Wealth’; Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, ‘Top’.

²For specific details on this wealth measure, which are valuations of a deceased’s estate, see Cummins, ‘Where’; Rubinstein, ‘Probate’; Rubinstein, *Men*; Harbury, ‘Inheritance’; Harbury, and Hitchens, *Inheritance*.

I define ‘hidden’ wealth as wealth missing from the perspective of the probate calendars, and therefore the tax authorities. This holistic definition of ‘hidden’ wealth does not necessarily correspond to wealth that is illegally concealed. However it is motivated by the fact that the empirical characterization of the English wealth distribution in the 20th century is in the main, based upon such declared wealth-at-death data.³ The *Probate Registry Calendars* represent the most comprehensive, population-wide source of consistently collected wealth-at-death estimates. A portion of ‘hidden’ wealth will be legal portfolio re-arrangement to tax-exempt trusts, inter-vivos bequests, charitable donations, gifts to non-family members, and a portion will *potentially* be illegal tax evasion.

The method outlined here is a simple accounting exercise that exploits the nominal, individual level Calendar data. The key identifying assumption is that wealth declared before 1920 was a more accurate measure of the ‘true’ wealth of a dynasty, than declared wealth after 1920. The observed incentives suggest that this is reasonable; taxes on wealth before 1920 were a tiny fraction of what they were to become after 1920.⁴

During the low tax era, 1892-1920, I sum declared wealth at death, by dynasty. I then calculate an expected flow of inherited wealth for these dynasties from 1920 to 1992 using new estimates of the rate of return for different wealth portfolios. These estimates incorporates war-time destruction, the specific amount of inheritance tax paid, capital income tax and the average asset composition of different wealth groups.

For most, wealth after 1920 is in excess of that predicted by the inheritance flow from 1892-1920. This is newly created wealth. However, for certain elite dynasties, declared wealth is systematically below expected wealth from inheritance. This is hidden wealth.⁵

Let us take the Axxxxxxx family as a concrete case study to illustrate the method (I have anonymised the name).⁶ In the 1881 census of England and Wales, there are 39 people with the surname Axxxxxxx. Between 1892 and 1920 I observe 4 probated deaths. The sum of the wealth of the Axxxxxxx’s in this period is £12.4 Million (in £2015). Post 1920, I expect this amount of capital to generate a flow of wealth that should show up in the probate records of the Axxxxxxxs. This flow is calculated based on the rate-of-return of wealth in the economy, net of inheritance and capital income tax. All of these elements are separately calculated, as is wartime destruction of wealth.

As figure 1 illustrates, the declared wealth of the Axxxxxxx dynasty is far below what we would expect from that observed before 1920. The difference between the expected flow of inherited wealth, and that actually declared is hidden wealth. In the period 1980-1992, this amounts to over £3m. The Axxxxxxxs *could* be hiding about 94% of their inherited wealth. Despite the fact that

³If wealth is missing, or ‘hidden’, from the Probate calendars, it is also missing from analyses using related sources, for example Atkinson and Harrison, *Distribution*; Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison, ‘Trends’; Atkinson, ‘Wealth’; Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, ‘Top’. These authors use aggregated summary data from the Inland Revenue for their estimates.

⁴This analysis focuses on the tax incentives to hide wealth. However, elites could have anticipated the social mood, perhaps after the Third Reform Act of 1884, and acted to conceal their wealth to deflect social and political attention. However, as this analysis presents estimates of the minimum proportions of wealth hidden after 1920, the key assumption that observed wealth 1892-1920 is more directly measuring true wealth, than it is after 1920, still holds, even if some elites concealed wealth before 1920.

⁵Figures 19c and 19d report the declared wealth of two ‘hiding’ dynasties over the sample period, 1892-1992. Figure 19e on the other hand reports the declared wealth of a dynasty creating new wealth. One of these dynasties is that of a former primeminister.

⁶The Axxxxxxxs are an English aristocratic family that traces its ancestors to the 10th century. A google search reveals connections to the Royal family and many MPs of that name. I illustrate other surnames dynasties in this way in appendix figure 19.

there are only 96 Axxxxxxxs in England in 2002, the name appears in the *Offshore Leaks database*.⁷

This paper finds thousands of dynasties that appear to be hiding wealth such as the Axxxxxxxs. Specifically I can name 9,077 dynasties hiding at least £8.9 Billion (£2015). I show that this hidden wealth estimate predicts a dynasty's appearance in the *Offshore Leaks Database*. I further show that hidden wealth is correlated with postcode house-value in 1999, and attendance at Oxford and Cambridge Universities, 1990-2016. These hidden wealth correlations are apparent even when controlling for observed wealth.

A crucial clarification is due: for any one dynasty, the categorization of the missing wealth as hidden is a *probability*. The random hazards of marriage choices, mad inheritors, disastrous investments, betrayal, theft, stupidity and chance can dilute and destroy even the grandest of fortunes. The method I apply here is not meant to be an accurate point estimate of the precise wealth for any one dynasty. Rather, it is designed to estimate a plausible minimum; at the group level, of the amount of inherited wealth that is hidden. Hidden wealth is typically never observed so we can only measure it's presence by the shadows it casts. In this specific case, the shadow is the wealth that should be reported, but is not; on average, for aggregated groups of English wealth elites over the twentieth century.

In this paper, I show that for Victorian elites, the richest 1,500 dynasties of the 1892-1920 period (of which the Axxxxxxx are members), wealth is systematically hidden.

For the analysis, I select only rare surnames of English origin, who have less than 100 people observed in the 1881 census, and track these rare surname dynasties in the Probate Calendars from 1892-1992. Formally, I compare *estimated* wealth with that later *actually observed* during the high-tax post war era. I incorporate wartime destruction and all death-taxes paid into this estimate of 'true' inherited-wealth.

To estimate this 'true' inherited wealth I apply a rate-of-return to the sum of observed wealth, pre-1920, that is based upon the portfolio composition of different wealth groups. I use the annual reports of the commissioners of *His Majesty's Inland Revenue* (after 1952, *Her Majesty's*) from ProQuest, (2018) to reconstruct the average portfolio composition for six broad wealth classes, from '£10,000 and under', to 'over £5,000,000 (£2015 prices)'.⁸ I then generate an expected rate of return on wealth for each class by matching the share of the asset in the portfolio to rates of return recently estimated by Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019).⁹ The resulting estimates show that over the 20th century the rich have a higher rate of return on their wealth than the poor.

Figure 2 illustrates the concept for calculating hidden inherited wealth.

At the aggregate, estimated wealth is lower than observed wealth as new wealth is being created by non-inheriting surname dynasties. Figure 17 reported in the appendix, illustrates how newly created wealth is captured. However, for the richest English dynasties, the Victorian Elite of 1892-1920, it is clear that at least 28-35% of all elite wealth is hidden by their descendants, 1950-1992.

At the individual surname level, this hidden wealth estimate, and the proportion of wealth hidden, strongly predict the appearance of a surname in the recent *Offshore Leaks Database* (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2019). This suggests that a proportion of inheritance taxation is potentially being evaded. Further, the richer the dynasty, the greater is the proportion of wealth hidden.

Using the locations of 31 Million UK voters from the *electoral roll* of 1999, and the complete

⁷International Consortium of Investigative Journalists *Offshore leaks database*.

⁸ProQuest, *UK parliamentary papers*.

⁹Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, 'Rate of return'.

price paid data for house sales 2017-8, I show that hidden wealth is associated with more expensive postcodes. Hidden wealth appears to boost contemporary consumption and living standards of hiding dynasties. Further, I show that their children are more likely to attend the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 1990-2016. Whilst the analysis cannot demonstrate that these relationships are causal, they do represent new descriptive patterns that demand an explanation via future research.

The fact that the estimates of dynastic hidden wealth correlate strongly with contemporary outcomes, are robust to different formulations (including different rates of return to wealth), and are highly statistically significant, is supportive of the validity of the method introduced by this paper.

Incorporating this elite hidden wealth into a recalculation of the top decile wealth share shows that the decline of the ‘true’ wealth share is significantly more muted than that for observed wealth. The richest one-percent hold an extra 8% of the ‘true’ wealth distribution (20% as opposed to an observed 12%), equivalent to a 28% reversal of the observed decline.¹⁰

This paper relates to existing work on the English wealth distribution.¹¹ Of more immediate relevance to hidden wealth is the recent work of Gabriel Zucman, analyzing systematic anomalies in the foreign assets and liabilities of countries, estimates that 8% of household wealth is held unrecorded in offshore tax havens.¹² Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, also using off-shore banking leaks and micro-data, from Norway, Denmark and Sweden, claim that “the 0.01% richest households evade about 25% of their taxes”.¹³

The analysis in this paper also relates to the debates between Modigliani, (1986); Modigliani, (1988) and Kotlikoff and Summers (1981); Kotlikoff, (1988) on the share of inheritance in wealth (here I model a dynasties wealth flow as that from capitalized bequests).¹⁴ For 19th century Paris, Piketty, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal apply an analogous methodology to uniquely rich individual level data, to understand the relative importance of inherited and self-made wealth. They find that 10% of Parisians own about 70% of all wealth, and that 70% of the top 1% are rentiers, living off their inheritance.¹⁵ However, I focus here on estimating systematically hidden wealth.

This paper presents a simple method, combining historical and contemporary data, to estimate hidden wealth at the surname level. This method produces a set of surnames that are potentially hiding a large amount of wealth. Tax authorities could use this information to investigate potential evasion.

Internationally, the pattern of a low-tax pre-war era followed by a high-tax post-war period is almost universal; applying the method presented in this paper to other historical wealth data from other countries could lead to the uncovering of vast sums of hidden wealth.

The implications of incorporating hidden wealth into the top wealth shares are of profound importance. Changes in wealth inequality were the largest equalizing force in the 20th century.¹⁶ This paper shows that the true top-wealth share did indeed decline but not by as much as that observed in the reported data. This finding is important for our empirical understanding of the true

¹⁰This is based on figure 11.

¹¹Piketty, *Capital*; Harbury, ‘Inheritance’; Harbury and McMahon, ‘Inheritance’; Harbury and Hitchens, ‘Inheritances’; Harbury and Hitchens, ‘Women’; Atkinson and Harrison, *Distribution*; Harbury, and Hitchens, *Inheritance*; Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison, ‘Trends’; Atkinson, ‘Wealth’; Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, ‘Top’; Scott, ‘Anatomy’.

¹²Zucman, ‘Missing’.

¹³Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, ‘Tax’.

¹⁴Modigliani, ‘Life’; Modigliani, ‘Role’, and Kotlikoff and Summers ‘Role’; Kotlikoff, ‘Intergenerational’

¹⁵Piketty, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal ‘Inherited vs self-made’ p.22.

¹⁶Piketty, *Capital*.

evolution of inequality over the last century and is crucial for attempts to understand the causal forces behind the ‘Great Equalization’. It also highlights the need for further research on hidden wealth, both contemporary and historically, in the UK and elsewhere.

The data for analysis are presented in section II, the methodology in section III, results in section IV (surname-group level) and section V (individual surname level). In appendix section C, I replicate the method and the empirical analysis using an alternative series for the rate of return to capital during the 20th century. Section VI reports an adjusted top 10% wealth share that accounts for hidden wealth, 1920-1992, and section VII concludes.

II Data

This paper exploits several newly constructed and existing datasets.

The Principal Probate Registry Calendar entries, 1892-1992

All estates of the deceased in England and Wales, above a threshold, require an act of probate for inheritors to legally execute a will. I use the complete individual level wealth-at-death records from the the *Principal Probate Registry (PPR) Calendar* entries, 1892-1992, to track English dynastic wealth.¹⁷ This source records all decedents in England and Wales with wealth above the threshold (currently £5,000).¹⁸ Name, address, date of death, the name of the executor and an estimate of estate value were consistently recorded. The original printed volumes were digitized and algorithmically parsed and formed into a database suitable for economic analysis, in a process described in Cummins, ‘Where’, who investigates in depth the quality of the resulting data, 15 million individual level wealth-at-death observations.

As Wedgwood states: “generally speaking, the probate valuations are restricted to property within the free disposition of the deceased ... at the time of his death” .¹⁹ It should be noted that it is only after 1898 that unsettled realty is included, and only after 1925 when settled realty is part of the estate valuation. This will bias the hidden wealth estimates presented later downwards, as inherited realty is counted only after 1925 and not before. This supports the argument that the hidden wealth estimates of this paper are a lower-bound.

Estates were valued at market prices. The wealth information is imperfect; the biggest consistent omission is ‘unsettled personalty’ - for example trust funds.²⁰ Also, there is no information on inter vivos gifts, nor on transfers to spouses, or to charity (these were never subject to inheritance tax). In addition, age at death is not reported.²¹ Pension entitlements and annuities that end with death

¹⁷Existing research directly using the individual probate valuations includes Wedgwood, ‘Influence of Inheritance’; Harbury, ‘Inheritance’; Perkin, ‘Recruitment’; Rubinstein, ‘Wealth’; Rubinstein, ‘Victorian’; Rubinstein, *Men*; Nicholas, ‘Clogs’; Turner, ‘Wealth’; Clark and Cummins, ‘Intergenerational’; Clark and Cummins ‘Malthus’. These valuations are available online from 1858 to 1996. However, the automated data extraction method I employed (as described in Cummins, (2021)) could only extract data from 1892-1992. Before 1892, the two-column format of the calendars resulted in many mismatched records, and after 1992, the format of the entries was changed to all capital letters making the relative extraction of individual information impossible after 1992.

¹⁸The probate threshold during the period 1858-1900 was £10, 1901-1931: £50, 1932-1964: £100, 1965-1974: £500, 1965-1974: £500, 1975-1984: £1,500, 1984 onwards: £5,000 Cummins, 2021, table 1.

¹⁹Wedgwood, ‘Influence of Inheritance’ p.42.

²⁰Rubinstein, ‘Probate’ p.70.

²¹As the dead are not a random sample of the general population, this is a possible source of bias. However, Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, ‘Top’, who use a related source, aggregated summary tables from the Inland Revenue, show in their figure 6 (p.18), that there is no substantive difference in the level or trend of wealth inequality when

are completely omitted from the valuations, as is the cash value of joint bank accounts. There are more omissions and weaknesses.²² However, even considering these numerous, major flaws, the PPR Calendar valuations remain the best and most consistent, systematically collected estimates of individual English wealth-holding over the 20th century.

The wealth-share estimates of the top percentiles from the PPR Calendars match closely existing estimates.²³ Figure 3a compares the PPR percentile shares of the English wealth at death distribution with those from (Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018).²⁴ The PPR Calendar data also matches well with estimates of aggregate non-pension wealth, as illustrated in figure 3b.²⁵ The empirical base for historical wealth estimates are limited so there are very few studies to compare with the PPR data. However, Lydall and Tipping, who used the 1954 Oxford Savings Surveys to calculate a representative estimate of the individual wealth distribution below £2,000. Above £2,000, they used estate duty returns. In figure 3c I compare their estimates with those from the PPR Calendars. There is a striking correspondence.²⁶

The evidence from existing studies support the credibility of the PPR Calendar wealth data.

Taxes Due at Death

Death duties are complicated taxes made up of different time-varying components. All death duties, composed of legacy, succession, estate duties (1892-1974), capital transfer tax (1974-1986), and inheritance tax (1986 and after) were collected: HM Revenue and Customs reports the schedules 1894 to 1974.²⁷ Capital transfer tax replaced estate duty in 1975 and was itself replaced by inheritance tax in 1986. Inheritance tax is a flat 40% above the nil-rate threshold (reported by HM Revenue and Customs). The Institute for Fiscal Studies collected the historical series for both inheritance tax and capital transfer tax.²⁸

Figure 13, in the appendix, reports the total rate of death duties due by a set of estate values (in £2015), 1892-2015. By combining the tax and probate data it is simple to calculate tax paid. Table 1 reports the largest tax payers in England, 1892-1992.²⁹

Variable Rates of Return based on the Composition of Wealth

To calculate the rate of return on inherited wealth I combine new data on the composition of wealth by estate value range, with existing estimates for the rate of return on different asset classes over the 20th century.³⁰

adjusting by age at death.

²²As detailed in Cummins, 'Where'.

²³Specifically, Atkinson and Harrison, *Distribution*; Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison, 'Trends'; Atkinson, 'Wealth' and Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 'Top', who use aggregated returns reported by the Inland Revenue.

²⁴I use the estimates reported in Table D1 of the working paper version, Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 'Top'. See the appendix for a comparison of average wealth per adult.

²⁵As reported by Blake and Orszag 'Annual estimates'.

²⁶Lydall and Tipping, (1961).

²⁷HM Revenue & Customs *Scale*, available at <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/>.

²⁸Institute for Fiscal Studies, *Rates*, 1986 to today; available at <https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/ff/iht.xls>.

²⁹Note that the Grosvenor family famously invested the majority of their family fortune in a trust thus avoiding inheritance tax (See for example this story from *The Times*: [link](#)). The richest English women in the data, Eleanor Countess Peel, established a well endowed charitable trust with her estate (peeltrust.com). This will count as 'hidden' wealth in this analysis.

³⁰A previous, working paper version of this analysis (Cummins, 'Hidden wealth') used aggregate rates of return.

The PPR Calendar’s wealth summary is limited to an estimate of the value of a decedent’s estate. To examine the composition of decedent’s wealth I extracted breakdowns of wealth-at-death by asset type from the annual reports of the commissioners of *His Majesty’s Inland Revenue* (after 1952, *Her Majesty’s*) from ProQuest, (2018).³¹ From 1908, detailed breakdowns of the composition of wealth-at-death by estate value ranges are reported, annually.³² After 1968, the breakdown is reported in a new publication, entitled *Inland Revenue Statistics*.³³

A sample photograph of the tables used, for the year 1920, is presented in appendix figure 14. I digitized this set of tables for the years 1906, 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1939, 1949, 1956, 1960, 1968, 1981 and 1990 (as close to every year ending in a 0 or a 5 that I could access).

I assign each reported category of wealth from these sources to one of five broad categories of wealth; equity, housing, government bonds and bills, cash and other.³⁴ Table 11, in the appendix, details how this allocation between the Inland Revenue categories and the five broad categories employed in the analysis here. The ‘other’ category generally comprised ‘policies of insurance’ and ‘trade assets’.

Figure 4 reports the composition of wealth-at-death, by broad asset category, for six ranges of estate value (in 2015 pounds). In general poorer decedent’s hold a greater proportion of their wealth in cash and housing with richer decedents holding significantly more equities. For these richer groups, equity and housing have increased their share over the second half of the 20th century.³⁵

I then calculate rates of return for each of these wealth groups, based upon the different asset compositions, and rates of return³⁶ as

$$r^w = E_t^w * r_t^E + B_t^w * r_t^B + H_t^w * r_t^H + C_t^w * r_t^C + O_t^w * r \quad (1)$$

where r is the rate of return for year t for one of the wealth groups, w ; £10,000 and Under, £10,000-£100,000, £100,000-£500,000, £500,000-£1,000,000, £1,000,000-£5,000,000, and Over £5,000,000. E is the share of equity in a wealth group’s overall wealth, B is the share of Govt. bonds, H is housing wealth, C is cash and O is other types of wealth (these shares sum to one). r is the rate of return for each broad class, as reported by Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019).³⁷ I use the aggregate rate of return as the relevant return for the ‘Other’ wealth class.³⁸ I transform r to decadal moving averages, centered on the year of death of the decedent.

³¹ProQuest, *UK parliamentary papers*.

³²Before 1908 only a simple aggregate breakdown for all estates is presented.

³³Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, *Inland Revenue statistics*.

³⁴Corresponding to available rates of return.

³⁵Note that the proportion of wealth in housing of the ‘£10,00 and under group’ in 1990 is set at zero. The actual proportion is negative (due to mortgage debt.)

³⁶From Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, ‘Rate of return’ and Bank of England, ‘Millennium’. Figure 15, in the appendix, reports the rates of return for each of these five classes.

³⁷The underlying data are described in the appendix to that paper, pages A82-84 (house price and rent data), A100 (equity and bond returns).

³⁸As table 11 reports, ‘cash’ refers to both cash in “the house and in the bank”, as well as “household goods”. Blake and Orszag ‘Annual estimates’ report the composition of cash holdings between cash and deposit accounts (table 1, p.399). Of all cash wealth, 7% is in cash itself, and 93% is in deposit accounts, 1948-1994. I therefore calculate the rate of return on cash as being

$$r_t^C = .1 * \left(\frac{CPI_{t-1}}{CPI_t} - 1 \right) + .9 * \left(i_t^{BOE} + \left(\frac{CPI_{t-1}}{CPI_t} - 1 \right) \right)$$

where CPI is the Consumer Price Index, and i^{BOE} is the ‘Bank Rate’ reported by Bank of England, ‘Millennium’. I simplify the shares to 10%/90% (cash/deposits) to account for the household goods component.

The goal here is to use r to best-guess the rate of growth of inherited fortunes; an individual’s financial assets are unlikely to be liquidated annually, so a decadal moving average gives a more realistic estimate of the likely gains or losses to the inheritance. The observed wealth shares by wealth range are interpolated to generate annual values that are matched to the annual moving-average rates of return.

Figure 5 reports these rates of return that vary by wealth. There is a striking difference in the rate of return to wealth for the rich and the poor. This is because the rich have a greater share of their wealth in high yielding assets such as equities. The poor have a far greater share of their wealth in cash, which due to inflation, typically has a negative rate of return.³⁹

Finally, I calculate the net-of-taxes r , r^* , as $r^* = r - t$, where t is the highest rate of tax on capital income estimated by Atkinson for the UK, 1908-1992, and reported by Piketty (2014)⁴⁰. This is of course unrealistic but is designed so that we are measuring a plausible minimum inherited wealth accumulation trajectory. Where the return on wealth is estimated as negative, $r < 0$, I set $t = 0$, as taxes are not due on negative capital income.

Offshore Leaks

The *Offshore Leaks Database* by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) contains detailed information on individuals connected to one or more of 785,000 offshore companies, foundations and trusts, from four recent data leaks; the Paradise Papers (2017 and 2018, principally from the law firm Appleby), the Panama Papers (2016, the law firm Mossack Fonseca), the Bahamas Leaks (2016, official corporate registry) and the Offshore Leaks (2013, Portcullis Trustnet and Commonwealth Trust Limited). Once cleaned and filtered, there are 298,015 names of individuals behind these Offshore entities and I utilize these names in my analysis.⁴¹

It is of course not illegal to be a director or owner of a foreign entity. However, the presence, or not, of elite inheritors in these lists is useful for our understanding of the destination of some of this hidden wealth.

Contemporary Outcomes: House Prices and Oxbridge Attendance

For contemporary outcomes by surname I collected individual nominal data on locations, house prices, and Oxford and Cambridge University attendance.

All voters in the UK are listed in the *electoral roll*. I extracted the records of the 1999 UK *electoral roll* from a CD-ROM entitled UK-Info Disk (2000). 1999 was the last year that the complete, pre opt-out, electoral roll was available. This resulted in 31,551,398 observations of forename, surname, specific address, and postcode.⁴²

³⁹A separate but related issue is the ability of the rich to capture higher returns on their wealth due to access to specialized financial advice. It is not then just the distribution of asset categories within estates that matters but their quality (see chapter 12 in Piketty, *Capital*, recent empirical estimates of wealth rate-of-return heterogeneity for Norway from Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino and Pistaferri, ‘Heterogeneity’, and also Daniels and Campion, (1936), who briefly discuss this for the UK in the early 20th century, linking differential rates-of-return for richer wealth-holders to the development of joint stock companies (p.60)). However, here I am interested in estimating a plausible minimum for the rate of return on wealth, so no adjustment is made to account for this potential effect.

⁴⁰The original sources are Sabine, *History* and the Annual Reports of the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue.

⁴¹International Consortium of Investigative Journalists *Offshore leaks database*. I combined the “Officer” field in all 4 databases and manually cleaned out companies and organizations.

⁴²Extracting the data from the 20 year-old CD-Rom interface was a technical challenge as only 250 records per individual search could be returned with a upper limit of 2,000 for any search criteria. Automation via jitbit

I then link the individual addresses from the electoral roll of 1999 to house price data by postcode in 2017 (from the land registry)⁴³. There are 1,758,312 postcodes in the UK so this is a highly specific estimate of house values.

Attendance at Oxford and Cambridge Universities is sourced from official publications and email directories.⁴⁴

In addition to these data, this paper also uses the complete count of the 1881 Census of England and Wales, the Complete Death Register, 1892-2007 and multiple other ‘Big’ datasets.⁴⁵

III Methodology

The data allow me to observe all declared probated wealth 1892-1992. From the sum of this wealth for surname ‘dynasties’, 1892-1914, I can estimate the flow of ‘expected wealth’, 1920-2018. By comparing estimated with observed wealth, and accounting for taxes; I can estimate how much of English wealth is ‘hidden’.

This section details my methodology for defining surname ‘dynasties’, calculating wartime destruction, estimating expected wealth and measuring surname representation in the *ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database*.

I use rare surnames to track dynastic wealth over time. In England, surnames are hereditary and are typically passed down through the male line just as the non-recombining region of the Y-chromosome. Thus surnames generally mark clusters of genetically related men (and can be deduced from human genomes, finding current utility in modern forensics).⁴⁶

The probability of co-ancestry of two individual men sharing a surname is dependent on the number of founders of a surname, the incidence of non-paternities and genetic drift. Rare surnames are significantly more likely to indicate co-ancestry (surname counts under 5,000).⁴⁷ Here rare surnames, defined as a count of less than 100 people in the 1881 census, are employed under the assumption that the holders of that name are highly likely to not only share some co-ancestry but can be thought of as part of the same surname ‘dynasty’. Under the assumption of positive assortative mating, I also include women.

The wealth-shares of the top-percentiles of the wealth distribution, 1892-1992, calculated at both the individual and rare-surname level are reported in figure 6. At the individual level, the top 10% have about 99% of all English wealth in 1900 - At the rare surname level the top decile have about 80% of all wealth. In 1992, the top 10% of individuals have over 60% of wealth whilst the top 10% of surname dynasties have just under 50%.

Despite these level differences, the time trends in the individual and rare surname series are remarkable similar (compare figure 6a with figure 6b and 3a). This suggests that the rare-surname level grouping captures the changing dynamics of the 20th century wealth distribution.

Harbury and McMahon note:

Macro Recorder (<https://www.jitbit.com/macro-recorder/>) over several months resulted in apx. 31m duplicate free records. This represents a sample of apx. 70% (where 100% is 44m). The sample is complete for rarer names but incomplete for common names due to the 2,000 results per query hard limit.

⁴³‘Price paid’ data was downloaded from <http://prod.publicdata.landregistry.gov.uk.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/pp-complete.txt> (HM Land Registry, 2018).

⁴⁴See Clark and Cummins ‘Surnames’; Clark, Cummins et al. *Son Also Rises*; Clark and Cummins, ‘Intergenerational’; Clark and Cummins ‘Big Sort’.

⁴⁵Summarized in Cummins, ‘Constructing’; Cummins, ‘Where’.

⁴⁶Gymrek et al., ‘Identifying’.

⁴⁷King et al., ‘Genetic Signatures’; King and Jobling, ‘Founders’

some observers contend that the decline in the share of the richest percentiles in the wealth distribution may be quite misleading, and reflect merely a rearrangement of wealth within families, rather than a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor families⁴⁸

Figure 6 indicates that the ‘Great Equalization’ of English wealth is reflected at the surname-dynasty level and not only the individual level. Therefore rearrangement of wealth within families cannot explain the decline in the wealth share of the top 10%. (If it were, this would show up as no change in the rare surname level wealth-shares 1900 to 1992.)

Table 2 reports the distribution of English surnames, population in 1881 and population in 2002, by surname count ranges.⁴⁹ Rare surnames are both more likely to go extinct, or increase far more rapidly than common surnames. There are 34,928 surnames that are held by more than one and less than 100 people in 1881. I omit surnames that have only one holder as they are likely transcription errors. Of these 34,928 surnames, 18,921 appear at least once time in the PPR calendar between 1892 and 1920. I track these 18,921 names in the analysis. This set of surnames represent 758,755 individuals in 1881 and 1,503,669 in 2002.⁵⁰

I define a ‘Victorian rare elite’ as the top 1,500 richest wealth-holding surnames from 1892 to 1920, for those surnames held by 2-100 people in the 1881 census (I drop surname counts of 1).⁵¹ Individuals holding these surnames die on average 420% richer than the average person, 1892 to 1992. By following these rare surnames in the PPR data, I can observe dynastic wealth. Table 3 also details the distribution of English surnames, population in 1881 and population in 2002, by surname count ranges. for this Victorian rare elite.⁵²

In addition a ‘middling’ Victorian wealth grouping, ranked 8,740-10,239 out of a rare lineage universe of 18,921 and a Victorian ‘bottom’ grouping, the bottom ranked 5,000 wealth holders, out of the same 18,921 surnames.

Using the PPR calendar probate micro-data, I estimate *expected* wealth, W^* at year t of of rare surname j

$$W_{j,t}^* = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{1920} W_j}{28} (1 + r_{1920}^{net})(1 + r_{1921}^{net}) \dots (1 + r_{t-1}^{net}) \quad (2)$$

⁴⁸Harbury and McMahon, ‘Inheritance’ p.810

⁴⁹Ethnicity was assigned to every observed surname using ONOMAP name classification software (<http://www.onomap.org/>) provided to me by Paul Longley and Oliver O’Brien (Both Department of Geography, University College London). Mateos, Longley and O’Sullivan ‘Ethnicity’ describe the methodology behind such surname ethnicity classifiers. Using telephone directories, electoral registers and other similar sources, from nearly all countries in the World, they run a network analysis that connects personal names to each other (nodes) by forename-surname pairs (edges). These constructed ‘naming networks’ spontaneously produce clusters that map onto ethnocultural groups. Norman names such as Darcy, Neville, FitzWilliam and Zouch are typically assigned as ‘English’, and not French. This is important due to their presence amongst the elites in England; On this long persistence see Clark and Cummins ‘Surnames’.

⁵⁰The full population of all 34,928 surnames in 1881 is 1,047,459 and 2,095,463 in 2002, as table 2 reports (the smaller analytical sample is based upon those dynasties reporting some wealth, 1892-1920).

⁵¹Queen Victoria died on 22 January 1901, so consider the name a nominal convenience and not a iron-clad definition. (As an aside; the monarch is not subject to probate (Nash, *Royal* p.128)).

⁵²The two tables we can immediately rule out differential fertility as a potential channel behind the dilution of elite wealth. By comparing the growth rate of rare names in the population, 1881-2002 to names in the Victorian top-one-percent, it can be seen that if anything elite fertility acted against wealth dilution. At every range, the growth rate of the ‘Victorian Elite’ is lower (or only marginally higher in the 5-10 count range) than that of the general population. Surname extinction rates of the Victorian elite are also lower (again apart from the 5-10 count range).

where W is observed real wealth (2015 pounds) in any year, 1892-1920, growing at the net-of-taxes, wealth specific, rate of return on wealth, r^{net} , where taxes are the maximum tax rate on capital income (T^K), estimated as

$$r_t^{net} = r_t^w - T_t^K \quad (3)$$

Every dynasty receives a specific r that is based upon their wealth (w) at time t , as described in section II. ⁵³ I divide the initial capital estimate by 28 to estimate the subsequent, expected annual flow of wealth (1920 – 1892 = 28).

The major weakness of my approach is that it cannot measure *new* wealth creation by elite inheritors (although new wealth creation by non-inheritors is observed, see equation 8 below). This is of course an unrealistic assumption. However, the purpose of the exercise is to estimate a *lower* bound for the amount of wealth hidden by the English elite. Any new elite-inheritor wealth creation will make W^* an underestimate of their ‘true’ dynastic wealth.

Acting against this will be the possible consumption of inherited wealth. If wealth is systematically spent on consumption and not invested, then my estimate of ‘hidden’ wealth is not truly concealed wealth but simply a measure of lost wealth due to consumption. At the dynastic level, I assume that the propensity to consume wealth and the propensity to add to dynastic wealth through income, result in a zero net gain or loss to the sum of inherited wealth. Supporting this assumption is the remarkable stability in the ranking of English dynasties, at the rare surname level.⁵⁴

To estimate a lower bound on the amount of wealth hidden by the elite lineages, I apply the following logic: If death taxes, denoted as T^D , are close to zero, then there is no financial incentive for the rich to make arrangements to avoid paying taxes upon death. When $T^D > 0$, we can expect rational agents with bequest motives to avoid (legal) and perhaps evade (illegal) paying death taxes. This can be done by inter-vivos bequests and transferring assets between classes (for example trusts and offshore companies). Suppose family j has total wealth W

$$W_j = \alpha(W_j) + (1 - \alpha)W_j \quad 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1 \quad (4)$$

where α is the propensity to avoid/evade, and is an increasing function of the tax rate and other factors that make it easier or harder to hide wealth (Z)⁵⁵:

$$\alpha = f(T^K, T^D, W, Z) \quad (5)$$

When taxes are 0, the observed estate at death is the true underlying wealth, W_j . This is the case in England before WWI. After WWI, observed wealth at death is the second component of equation 4. Death taxes (T^D) are substantially lower before WWI than after. For the super-wealthy, the maximum death duty is $\approx 10\%$, 1894-1910. From 1945-1958, the maximum $\approx 70-80\%$

⁵³The Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, ‘Rate of return’ estimates of r incorporate the negative returns to wealth during World War II. In section C I estimate expected wealth, W^* , using alternative aggregate rates of return on capital from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, ‘Rate of return’ and Piketty, *Capital*.

⁵⁴As documented by Clark and Cummins, ‘Intergenerational’. That study, using a subsample of the PPR calendar data used in this paper, estimate the intergenerational correlation of dynastic wealth at .7-.75. Over the sample period, Elite English dynasties regress towards the mean, but at a glacial pace. Further, there was no evidence for the very rich to regress to the mean faster than the not-so-rich, the average or the poor (Clark and Cummins, ‘Intergenerational’, a finding that tends to get overlooked in the literature).

⁵⁵These may include legal changes, technology, culture and so on. See Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, (2019) for recent evidence on the positive relationship between wealth and the propensity to evade tax.

(HM Revenue & Customs (2005), and plotted in appendix figure 12d). Pre-War the PPR records reveal ‘true’ family wealth, W_j .⁵⁶ After they reveal $(1 - \alpha)W_j = W_j^{obs}$.⁵⁷

Cumulative tax paid (T^p) is calculated as

$$T^p = \sum_{1920}^t T_t^D * W_{j,t}^{obs} \quad (6)$$

where as before death taxes are T^D and W^{obs} ($= (1 - \alpha)W$) is observed wealth from the PPR calendars.

Where estimated wealth is greater than reported wealth inclusive of cumulative death-taxes paid, I calculate the difference as hidden wealth (HW). I divide cumulative taxes paid by 30 so that death taxes are effectively charged once per generation. Again this is to estimate the expected annual flow as equation 4.

$$HW_{j,t} = W_{j,t}^* - \left[W_{j,t}^{obs} + \frac{T^p}{30} \right] : W_{j,t}^* > W_{j,t}^{obs} + \frac{T^p}{30} \quad (7)$$

Note that by construction, HW must be greater than zero. Observed wealth that is in excess of that predicted by the level of inherited wealth, I calculate:

$$HW_{j,t} = \left[W_{j,t}^{obs} + \frac{T^p}{30} \right] - W_{j,t}^* : W_{j,t}^* < W_{j,t}^{obs} + \frac{T^p}{30} \quad (8)$$

which by construction gives negative HW , which is newly created wealth.

Next I estimate the ‘true’ wealth, W , of English dynasties, 1920-2018. This is done in 2 parts, for wealth inheritors and for those creating new wealth. Inheritors W is calculated as:

$$W_{j,t} = W_{j,t}^* - \left[\frac{T^p}{30} \right] \quad (9)$$

And for new wealth creation dynasties, wealth in excess of that predicted by inheritance, W is calculated by

$$W_{j,t} = \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right) W_{j,t}^{obs} \quad (10)$$

Newly created wealth is incorporated by adjusting upwards observed wealth (W^{obs}) by the implied population degree of tax avoidance, α .⁵⁸ This is initially given a value of $\alpha = .0$ for

⁵⁶In the analysis I use 1920 as the cut-off for observing ‘true’ wealth. This is due to the structural break in the trend of the top 1% in apx. 1920 as revealed in figure 12a.

⁵⁷One could argue that privacy concerns might motivate some to conceal their true wealth. But that will still make wealth observed when tax = 0 a much more accurate estimate of family wealth than when tax is significantly greater than 0.

⁵⁸For a proportion of the surname-generation level estimates (8,469/56,937), the estimate of newly created wealth is *greater* than that observed ($HW > W^{obs}$). This happens for dynasties where new wealth is being created that is in excess of that predicted by observed dynastic capital pre-1920. The case can be illustrated with a specific lineage (anonymized). The XXXXXX dynasty (97 people counted in the 1881 census, 129 in 2002) report £1,052,781 in wealth 1950-1980. Their estimated wealth, assuming no deaths taxes, for 1950-80 is £595,229, and when this is compared with that observed *plus* taxes-paid factored back in ($W^{obs} + £826,353 = £1,879,134$), their implied newly created wealth ($-HW$) is £1,283,904. (All in 2015 pounds.) The problem is that the method returns a value for newly created wealth that is *greater* than that observed. Their inheritance, accounting for tax paid is negative ($W^* - TP/30 = -£231,124$). Common sense would indicate that best estimate of their true wealth is their observed

simplicity but is varied in section VI when calculating wealth shares (see tables 5 and 7 for the empirical estimates).

Finally I calculate the proportion of wealth hidden, α , as

$$\alpha_{j,t} = \frac{HW_{j,t}}{W_{j,t}} \quad (11)$$

By construction, α ranges from -1 (all wealth observed is newly created wealth) to $+1$ (all wealth is hidden).

Table 4 summarizes the sources for estimating the elements of equations 1 to 11.

IV Results

Figure 7 reports three series: estimated lineage wealth (equation 2), observed wealth $((1 - \alpha)W)$ and observed wealth plus taxes paid (T^p), accumulating at r^{net} , for all wealth holders, 1920-1992. At this aggregate, the *positive* difference between the estimated and observed series is new wealth creation (see also figure 18 in the appendix which compares estimated wealth with observed for the middling and bottom wealth holding groups).

However, when the exercise is executed for the Victorian rare elite lineages, as in figure 7b, the pattern is different. The first observation to note is the close correspondence of estimated and observed wealth from 1920 to 1950.⁵⁹ This suggests that using the methodology is plausible for tracking the wealth trajectory of this Victorian Elite. To formally assess this I run a simple regression with observed wealth (plus inheritance taxes paid) as a function of estimated wealth. Before 1950, the coefficient on estimated wealth as a predictor of observed wealth, plus inheritance tax paid, is 1.014 (with a standard error of .033).⁶⁰

After 1950, reported wealth at death is consistently and systematically below the level of wealth we would expect. This is hidden wealth. From 1950 to 1985, this coefficient on estimated wealth as a predictor of observed wealth, plus inheritance tax paid, is .648 (.012). This implies that about 35% of wealth is hidden, on average, over this period.⁶¹ The emergence of systematically hidden elite wealth is coincident with a large uptick in the levels of inheritance tax applied to estates of £5-10 Million (2015 prices), as reported in figure 13.

Precisely, how much wealth, as a lower bound, is being hidden by these Victorian elites?

What is the Propensity to Hide Wealth?

Table 5 reports the sum of hidden wealth by decade (as equation 7) and the mean value of α (the proportion of ‘true’ wealth hidden) for the Victorian elite lineages, 1920-1990. The results indicate that a *lower* bound of 28-39% of inherited wealth is hidden for this elite grouping, post 1950. The

wealth. Therefore, for these cases, I assign all wealth observed as new wealth ($HW = -W^{obs}$) and the proportion of hidden wealth is assigned as -1 (all wealth is new).

⁵⁹Note also that reported wealth plus taxes paid is higher than expected wealth for most of the late 1940s. This may reflect a desire for the very rich to contribute to the financing of the war or a lag in adjusting their behavior to the new high-tax regime. After 1950, this abruptly disappears. Note also the rise in reported wealth plus tax after 1980. This corresponds with the aggregate rise and the lowering of the extreme death tax levels to 40%. Figure 18 in the appendix reports the same estimates for the Victorian mid and bottom Lineages.

⁶⁰The details of this regression are reported in table 18 in the appendix.

⁶¹As before, details are reported in appendix table 18.

proportion hidden, α , falls after the 1970s, coincident with the reduction of the extremely high death duties of the earlier post-War era.

V Surname Level Analysis

As opposed to looking at lineage groups of 1,500 names, in this section I use all 18,921 rare surnames. I report the pattern of hidden wealth by decile and the predictive power of hidden wealth and the proportion of wealth hidden for appearance of a specific surname in the ICIJ *Offshore Leaks Database*. The impact of hidden wealth on contemporary outcomes; housing and elite education is estimated. Finally I recalculate the top 10% wealth-share, incorporating hidden wealth.

I aggregate all individual observations to the surname level by generation. The first generation is 1920-1950, the second is 1950-80 and the final generation is 1980-1992. Table 6 reports the summary statistics for the rare surname-level analysis.⁶² The size of these dynasties varies from 0-149 people dying in a generation with a median of 5. The median living population of people with these rare surnames in 2002 is 58, with a 0-597 range. 29% of the sample report wealth below what we would expect from their pre-1920 inheritance. There are 9,077 dynasties hiding £8.9 Billion (£2015).⁶³ 12% of the names show up in the paradise papers. A striking number in table 6 is the minimum reported hidden wealth, -1.27 Billion. This is the newly created wealth of the Ellerman dynasty (See table 1).⁶⁴

How does the tendency to hide wealth vary across the wealth distribution?

Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of the proportion of newly created and hidden wealth, as calculated by equation 11, by inferred ‘true’ wealth decile and generation. The density distribution is scaled so that the maximum value is 1. This is for easy comparability across the percentile groups. Figure 8 illustrates that the distribution of newly created wealth and hidden wealth is bi-modal. In general, newly created wealth dominates (negative hidden wealth, as indicated by the left-side of the distribution). For the poorest group, the bottom 70%, there is also a tendency for there not to be any high proportion of either new or hidden wealth. This is because wealth itself is so low for this group. (Mechanically if wealth is estimated as zero, hidden wealth is set at zero.)

The right-side of the distribution illustrated in figure 8 shows the *relative* proportion of hidden wealth.

In the 1920-1950 period, the top 10% of the wealth distribution hide less wealth than everyone else. Outside the top 10%, the relationship between wealth and the proportion of wealth ‘hidden’ is positive. For the post-War generations, there is a clear tendency for the higher wealth deciles, and in particular the top 10%, to hide proportionally more wealth.⁶⁵

To get a minimum value for the proportion of wealth hidden, I calculate the proportion of hidden wealth again, this time setting all newly created wealth at zero. This can give us a lower bound on the tendency to hide inherited wealth. Table 7 reports these proportions. From 1920 to

⁶²Note that the paradise paper link is done for generation 3, 1980-92, only. In the 1999 electoral roll, not all rare surnames are found: 18,126 out of 18,921 names are present, 795 are not.

⁶³This is the number of unique ‘hiding’ dynasties, where hidden wealth > 0 , across all 3 generations, and the sum of their maximum observed hidden wealth, as summarized in table 6

⁶⁴A portion of this estate was transformed in to a charitable trust and now funds the Scottish Ballet and Bumblebees (<https://ellerman.org.uk/what-weve-funded/case-studies>)

⁶⁵It is unclear why the top 10% hide so little 1920-50, relative to everyone else, and in contrast with their own behaviour after 1950. One speculation is that the top 10% felt compelled to contribute to the war effort during these years. But why they would feel compelled to *disproportionally* contribute, and why this ended after 1950 given reconstruction needs, is a mystery.

1950, about 22% of wealth is hidden and there is no gradient with respect to wealth. After 1950 however, a sharp gradient emerges. The very rich hide proportionally much more; at least 50% of hidden wealth is hidden for the top 1% 1950-1992. This contrasts with the flat gradient within the top 10%, where apx. 40% of wealth is hidden, estimated by Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, (2019) (see their figure 3 bottom panel).⁶⁶

From 1980-92 the percentage of ‘hidden’ wealth falls for all percentiles. But as this is a minimum, this should not be over-interpreted. This general tendency for my estimates of hidden wealth to fall over time may simply reflect the method: I calculate the share of inherited wealth from the 1892-1920 generation that is hidden. The share of newly created wealth hidden, 1920-1992, is not observed nor inferred. For this reason I consider the estimates from 1950-80 as the best guess estimate of the true hidden wealth share. The generation is not exposed to the capital destruction of a World War, economic growth is booming in Western Europe and death taxes are at their maximum. Inheritance from pre WWI is still a significant portion of all wealth. After 1980 new wealth creation means that my method loses power. In any case, at all times, my estimates are lower bounds.

In sum there is a positive relationship between the proportion of wealth hidden, and wealth. However the distribution of newly created wealth and hidden wealth is multi-modal. For the empirical analysis of dynastic outcomes in the next section, I code categorical variables to capture potential non-linear associations.

Is Hidden Wealth in Offshore Tax Havens?

At the group and surname level there is evidence that a significant portion of wealth is hidden. Where is it? Offshore companies, foundations and trusts serve as potential destination for hidden wealth. Here I compare surname-level estimates of hidden wealth (HW), with the appearance of those same surnames in the *Offshore Leaks Database*.⁶⁷

To measure presence in the *ICIJ* data, I code a simple 0/1 variable for a surnames presence ($D_{Paradise}$). As reported in table 6 about 12% of the sample surnames show up in the Paradise leaks (with a median equal to zero) and an average count of .7 (median also equal to zero). For the analysis only data from generation 3, 1980-1992, is used.

The general forms of the empirical models I apply to the surname level data are:

$$Y^j = c + \beta_1 \sum D_{OW}^j + \beta_2 X^j + \beta_3 \ln(N_{2002}^j) \quad (12)$$

$$Y^j = c + \beta_1 \sum D_{OW}^j + \sum \beta_{2i} D_{X^i} + \beta_3 \ln(N_{2002}^j) \quad (13)$$

$$X^j = \left\{ D_{Hider}^j, HW^j, \alpha^j \right\} \quad (14)$$

$$Y^j = \left\{ D_{Paradise}^j, H_{pcv}^j, OXB^j \right\} \quad (15)$$

where D_{OW} are categorical indicators for the wealth percentile observed from the PPR calendars for surname j . This set of values are one of the bottom 70% and every decile to the top 10%. N_{2002}

⁶⁶Both estimates are lower bounds. My estimates cannot capture newly created wealth, of elite inheritors. The estimates of Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, ‘Tax’ are for wealth in HSBC accounts only.

⁶⁷International Consortium of Investigative Journalists *Offshore leaks database*.

is the count of the surname in 2002 (ONS). X represents the set of hidden wealth calculations generated by this paper. I separately model D_{hider} , a categorical variable equal to 1 where hidden wealth is greater than zero and set to zero where no hidden wealth is estimated, α , as before, is the proportion of ‘true’ wealth hidden. D_X represents a set of categorical transformations of the hidden wealth calculations, designed to capture non-linear effects. In appendix table 21 I present estimates using exact observed wealth as a control, entered as a cubic expression, in place of the observed wealth percentile. The results are almost exactly the same.

Y^j is the set of outcomes I observe at the surname level. In addition to $D_{Paradise}$, I estimate the same functional form for the outcomes H_{ppcv}^j , the average postal-code value observed in the 1999 electoral roll and OXB^j , the attendance rate of a surname at Oxford and Cambridge Universities, 1990-2016. I use logistic regression to model the categorical dependent variable, $D_{Paradise}$.

The estimates are executed at the surname level, for all rare surnames. Table 8 reports the results for presence in the *ICIJ Paradise leaks database*.⁶⁸ Logistic regression coefficients (log-odds) are exponentiated to odds ratios for ease of interpretation and the regression t-statistics are reported in place of standard errors.⁶⁹ (The results and significance levels are not dependent on the method used, an OLS version of table 8 is reported in the appendix as table 20.)

Appearance of a surname in the Paradise papers leaks is related to the number of people with that surname counted in England and Wales by the ONS in 2002. As well as an essential control variable, this also serves as a sanity check on the empirical exercise. In every specification, the top wealth decile have an odds ratio of about 1.4 relative to the odds of the bottom 70%. The simple hider dummy also indicates a higher odds of appearing (1.26 times the odds of non-hiders) as does the level of hidden wealth. The effects of hidden wealth are non-linear as indicated by column 3. There, using categorical wealth groups, we see the odds of appearing in the paradise papers are 1.4 times higher for those who have an estimated lineage hidden wealth of £1m and up. All of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level with the top 10% dummy (all columns), the proportion of hidden wealth (column 4), and the simple hider dummy (column 1) all being significant at the $p = .001$ level.

In every column, the set of hidden wealth measures is informative of the probability of a surnames’ appearance in the Paradise papers leaks. Hidden wealth matters even when controlling for observed wealth. The correlation for those with an annual hidden wealth amounting to over £1m is approximately equal to the effect of being in the top 10% of the observed wealth distribution.⁷⁰

By cross-referencing the hidden wealth estimates with the *ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database* there is evidence that certain surname dynasties may be evading their taxes. Both hidden wealth and the propensity to hide wealth are statistically significant predictors of appearance in the *Offshore Leaks Database*, all the while controlling for total ‘true’ wealth. Figure 9 reports the top 50 dynasties, ordered by the amount of hidden wealth.⁷¹ I have anonymized the names.

⁶⁸All rare surnames appearing in the paradise papers were inspected by eye. Potentially misleading rare surnames that could also be confused with banking terms and jurisdictions (such as *Trust*, *Jersey* and *Pension*) were removed, as were names that were misclassified as English by Onomap. The regressions are run using the 15,975 surname observations that record at least one death 1980-92.

⁶⁹I choose to report t-statistics because the confidence intervals around odds ratios are non-symmetric so therefore the approximated standard error (for example the one reported in Stata) cannot be used to calculate them.

⁷⁰Investigations of the empirical models of the form in equations 12 and 13 on the count of a rare surname as dependent variable in the Paradise papers failed to generate any large or statistically significant results. Considering that hidden wealth predicts the probability of appearance, the count results imply that hidden wealth is negative associated with the count of a name in the paradise papers, once we examine variation above 0. This is confirmed by zero-inflated negative binomial models and censored OLS models (results available upon request).

⁷¹Table 17, in the appendix, lists the top 50 dynasties, their hidden wealth, their propensity to hide, the number

While the method employed here can claim that the Victorian Elite *as a group* are ‘hiding’ wealth, for any one lineage it is only a *probability*. The hazards of bad investments, mad inheritors, bad marriage choices, preferences for consumption over preservation of wealth and simple bad luck can easily destroy even the largest family’s wealth. At the surname-dynastic level, figure 9 and table 17 lists the hidiers as well as the unlucky. Without specific research into these families, we cannot say which category they belong to, hence I do not report their names.

Hidden Wealth and Contemporary Outcomes: Housing Value and Oxbridge Attendance

What is the impact of hidden wealth on contemporary outcomes? Tables 9 reports the correlations of hidden wealth, as equations 12 and 13, with average postcode house-value of a surname, observed in the 1999 electoral roll.

The top *observed* wealth percentiles live in more expensive postcodes than the bottom 70%. The top 10% live in houses that, are on average, about £92,000 more expensive than the bottom 70%. However, even controlling for observed wealth, hidden wealth matters. Knowing that a surname has *any* hidden wealth is associated with them living, on average, in a postcode with house prices that are almost £38,000 more expensive (col. 1). Knowing that a dynasty has over £1m in hidden wealth is associated with them, again on average, living in a postcode with nearly £87,000 more expensive homes (col. 3). The effect of hidden wealth is substantial and in most cases statistically significant at the one-tenth of one-percent level.

Table 10 reports the same empirical formulation as before (equations 12 and 13) for wealth and attendance at the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 1990-2016. Wealth has a strong effect on attending these institutions. In *Z* score units, where the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1, being a member of the top 10% of dynasties boosts Oxbridge attendance by .26 units ($p < 0.001$). For Oxbridge, hidden wealth predicts attendance, even when controlling for observed wealth. The effect is large; hidden wealth over £1m boosts attendance by .18 standardized units. For the hiding dummy, the amount of hidden wealth, wealth over £1m and the proportion of hidden wealth, the coefficients are significant at the one-tenth of one-percent level.

All of these ‘outcome’ results are insensitive to the type of wealth control used. In the appendix I substitute a cubic expression for wealth in place of the wealth deciles of equations 12 and 13. This is to capture any *within* decile wealth effects missed by the simple wealth decile dummy. Tables 21 (paradise appearance), 22 (post-code house price in 1999), 23 (Oxbridge attendance) show that the results for all the variables of interest are almost exactly the same as those reported in this section. The correlations of hidden wealth and contemporary outcomes are not a product of incorrectly specified wealth controls.

Interpretation

The surname level analysis reveals 9,077 dynasties hiding at least £8.9 Billion. The amount of this dynastic hidden wealth correlates strongly and positively with appearance in the *Offshore Leaks Database*, the post-code value of where people are living in 1999 and the rate of attendance at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. It is robust to different formulations, highly statistically significant, and thus supports the validity of the measure of hidden wealth proposed in this paper.

of them living in the UK in 2002, whether presence is recorded in the *Offshore Leaks Database* and whether they were members of the Victorian Elite.

If this missing wealth was not hidden, it would be an estimate of the failure of great dynastic fortunes to accumulate over time. Therefore the ‘hidden’ wealth would simply represent the gap between what’s left of the family fortune, and what should be there, had the estate being managed competently. If this was the case, we would *not* expect to find the positive correlations with the contemporary outcome variables.

However, this is not conclusive evidence that hidden wealth is *causal* in the determination of these contemporary outcomes. Alternative explanations are possible. This paper defined ‘hidden’ wealth as being that part of capitalized inheritance that does show up in probate records. These results could simply reflect the legal portfolio arrangement of elites⁷²; and the observed outcomes are to be expected, as we are simply adding another measure that correlates with underlying wealth.

More generally, it is not necessarily hidden wealth that transforms mediocre offspring into Oxbridge high flyers. Social networks, preferences for elite education and even Oxbridge admission procedures themselves could benefit the English elite, irrespective of their wealth.⁷³ Wealth itself, whether observed or ‘hidden’, and that part which manifests itself in someones house, will be a product of underlying family abilities and cultures.

One way to think about this is the causal schema drawn in figure 10. An unobserved latent factor, perhaps a vector of the characteristics discussed in the paragraph above, determines both observed and ‘hidden’ wealth, and also contemporary outcomes. This paper provides evidence that the conditional correlations, β_1 and β_2 are together both quantitatively and statistically significant. However both could be just an artifact of the channel driven by the unobserved latent factor, β_3 . In order to identify β_2 , the causal effect of ‘hidden’ wealth on outcomes, we need some historical shock that quasi-randomizes our measure of hidden wealth. Such a shock could perhaps be an abrupt legal change in the treatment of offshore wealth, where we could compare dynasties who experience the death of a major wealth-holder dying just before the change, with those who have a major wealth-holder die just after.⁷⁴ Alternatively, a micro-level analysis that conducts a detailed accounting of the wealth holdings of individual dynasties could demonstrate the importance, or not, of hidden wealth in the distribution of contemporary outcomes. Given the societal importance of this, future research should examine this.

The empirical analysis of outcomes and hidden wealth conducted here can only be claim that the hidden wealth-outcome correlations as descriptive. The correlations are consistent with hidden wealth being a significant factor in the distribution of contemporary social outcomes but the research design cannot claim causality. Rather they describe important empirical patterns that demand explanation, and signpost directions for future research.

⁷²Further, it is not illegal for an individual to be listed as a beneficiary or otherwise connected to an offshore entity.

⁷³The Oxbridge admission process is explored in detail in Nahai, ‘Meritocracy’. Zimdars note that “homophilic tendencies among selectors might account” for the unequal admission rates across social class Zimdars, ‘Fairness’ p.307.

⁷⁴One such case is that of *Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd v. Todd* (1929), decided on by the House of Lords which “created a loophole which in a sense made Britain a tax haven” Picciotto, *International* p.8. Picciotto states on the same page: “later, tax planners could set up foreign resident companies to ensure that individuals resident in the UK could escape tax.”

VI ‘True’ Inherited Wealth and the Decline of Elite Wealth. Accounting for the ‘Great Equalization’

Finally, what are the implications of hidden elite wealth for our understanding of the historical evolution of the wealth distribution? The standard interpretation is built upon the massive decline in the *observed* relative wealth-share of the top decile, the top percentile and the top .1%.⁷⁵ This narrative places Wartime destruction, taxes and economic growth as the causal forces behind the ‘Great Equalization.

Figure 11 reports recalculated wealth-shares based on ‘true’ wealth, incorporating estimates of the proportion of wealth hidden, and compares it with the observed series, for the top 10%, the top 1% and the top 0.1%. This is calculated as before over rare surnames, which, as discussed earlier, capture the secular decline in inequality over the 20th century. I use the estimates of the proportion of wealth hidden (α), by wealth percentile and period, from table 7, and employ them in estimating equation 10; $W = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} W^{obs}$, where W is ‘true’ wealth and W^{Obs} is wealth reported in the PPR calendars.

The declines of the top wealth shares, 1920-92, are still evident but are all of smaller magnitude. The top 10% hold 53% of all ‘true’ wealth in 1980-1992 compared with an observed wealth share of 48%. However because the very rich hide proportionally more, the top 1% and top 0.1% wealth shares are more severely underestimated. By 1990, the richest one percent of dynasties hold an extra 8% of the ‘true’ wealth distribution (20%, as opposed to the 12% from the observed data). This is equivalent to a 28% reversal of the observed decline. The pattern is similar for the top 0.1%; an observed share of 4% as compared to a ‘true’ 8%.⁷⁶ Given the methodology employed to generate these estimates, this must be interpreted as a minimum reversal.

In sum, these calculations suggest that the twentieth centuries observed decline in wealth shares has been overstated.

VII Conclusion

This paper introduces a method using historical data to detect hidden wealth at the surname level. The method does not claim to precisely measure estimate hidden wealth at the dynastic level. Rather, it uses historical trends to make an educated guess of a property which is unobserved, and only detectable by the shadows it casts. The method can give us a sense of the magnitude and characteristics of this unobserved portion of wealth, at the aggregate group level. Tax authorities could use this method to investigate potential tax-evasion amongst certain dynasties in England. Further, the method could be applied to other sources in other countries, with the potential to uncover vast amounts of hidden wealth.

In England, 1920-92, I find 9,077 dynasties that are potentially hiding at least £8.9 Billion.

The post-war era introduced wealth and death taxes sufficient to confiscate all elite wealth. Elites responded rationally. The analysis revealed that the English elites are hiding at least 28-39% of their true inherited wealth. Hidden wealth, calculated from the pre-WWI era, strongly correlates with the probability of a surname appearing in the *Offshore Leaks Database* of 2013-6. Hidden wealth appears to boost the value of hiding dynasties homes in 1999, and their children’s chances

⁷⁵ Atkinson and Harrison, *Distribution*; Piketty, *Capital*; Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, ‘Top’.

⁷⁶ This finding is similar to Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, ‘Tax’ who find that “accounting for hidden assets erases almost half of the decline in the top 0.1% wealth share observed”.

of attending Oxbridge, 1990-2016. Analyses of wealth-at-death reveal a secular observed decline in wealth inequality, driven by the top 1%. However when I calculate the ‘true’ inherited wealth of English dynasties I find that *at least* 28% of the decline of the top 1% wealth-share can attributed to hidden wealth. This is a lower-bound estimate.

One weakness of the approach followed here is the inability to distinguish between sources of wealth. Connecting the PPR Calendar wealth data to the 1873 *Return of Owners of Land* could reveal important differences in the trajectory of land-holding dynasties versus those who generated wealth from business. The role of the World Wars, inheritance and the decline in value of rural farm land could be traced in much higher fidelity than is possible here. Future detailed research, such as this, of individual dynasties, could more precisely estimate the scale of hidden wealth. Perhaps, this future research will reverse one of the great stylized facts of 20th century economic history; the ‘decline’ of the elite wealth-share.

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Figures




Figure 1: The Wealth at Death of Members of the Axxxxxxx Dynasty
 Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.






Figure 2: The Concept

Note: To estimate hidden inherited wealth, I project observed dynastic capital during the low-tax era forward using the net-of-taxes rate-of-return on wealth. I subtract inheritance tax paid. Hidden wealth is the difference between this expected wealth and that actually observed. I assume that wealth observed during the low-tax era is a much better approximation of true dynastic wealth than wealth observed during the high-tax era.



(a) Comparing Different Estimates of Top Wealth Shares, England 1892-1992



(b) Comparing Average Wealth with Blake and Orszag, *Annual Estimates*. (c) Comparison of Net Capital with Lydall and Tipping *Distribution*, by Wealth Band, 1950s

Figure 3: The PPR Calendar Wealth Data, Compared with Existing Estimates

Notes: See Cummins Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 13436 2019 for a detailed account of the source, construction and validation of the PPR data. Sources: PPR wealth data, Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, ‘Top’ table D1, Blake and Orszag ‘Annual estimates’ Table 12 (sum of columns ‘net financial wealth’, ‘housing wealth’ and ‘consumer durable assets’). These aggregate sums were converted to a per adult measure using population data from Office for National Statistics, Estimates of the population for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Source for figure c: Lydall and Tipping, ‘Distribution’ p.89. Note that the PPR covers England, the Lydall and Tipping, ‘Distribution’ estimates cover Great Britain. Both estimates exclude pension wealth.




Figure 4: The Composition of Wealth at Death, by Broad Asset Category, and Range of Real Estate Value 1906-1990






Figure 5: Rates of Return by Estate Value Range, 1910-1990

Notes: Rates of return are calculated using observed estate shares multiplied by rates of return from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, 'Rate of return' (See figure 4 and equation 1. I apply a 11 year moving average to the data on returns. *Source:* Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, 'Rate of return' (website). I interpolate housing returns 1940-5, as Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, 'Rate of return'. Estate value range is in real 2015 pounds.




(a) Individual Level




(b) Rare Surname Level

Figure 6: Observed Wealth Shares, Individual and Rare Surname Level, 1892-1992
 Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.



(a) All



(b) Victorian Elite Lineages

Figure 7: Estimated and Observed Lineage Wealth, with taxes paid, all and Victorian top 1% Lineages

Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.




Figure 8: The Proportion of Newly Created Wealth and Hidden Wealth, by Wealth Percentile
 Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.




Figure 9: The Top 50 Hiding Rare Surname Dynasties, Hidden and Declared Wealth

Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample. Rare surname Dynasties are those surnames that have a frequency of over one and less than 100 in the 1881 census of England and Wales (Schurer and Woollard, 1881 Census).







Figure 10: The Joint Determination of Observed Wealth, Hidden Wealth and Contemporary Outcomes



(a) Top 10%



(b) Top 1%



(c) Top 0.1%

Figure 11: Top Shares, Observed and 'True'

Notes: Calculated at the Rare Surname Level. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Tables

	Year	Name	County	Real Wealth	Death Duties, %	Tax Paid
1	1933	Sir John Reeves Baronet Ellerman	London	1,257,371,575	52	653,833,219
2	1974	Charles Cross	Hampshire	288,513,883	75	216,385,412
3	1935	TRH James Woolavington	Cornwall	345,796,993	52	179,814,437
4	1957	James Armand De Rothschild	Buckinghamshire	183,395,206	80	146,716,165
5	1958	William Stone	London	147,904,760	80	118,323,808
6	1940	TRH Marmaduke Furness	Leicestershire	139,121,970	67	93,211,720
7	1940	Jack Bamato Joel	London	138,382,028	67	92,715,959
8	1929	Bernhard Baron	East Sussex	213,606,754	42	89,714,837
9	1974	James Henry Bryan	West Midlands	119,247,477	75	89,435,608
10	1935	Arthur Stanley-Wills	North Yorkshire	169,260,470	52	88,015,445
11	1946	William Johnston Yapp	Kent	128,326,006	67	85,978,424
12	1953	Hugh Richard Grosvenor*	Cambridgeshire	105,630,735	80	84,504,588
13	1921	TRH Sir Ernest Joseph Cassel	London	199,628,495	42	83,843,968
14	1949	TRH Eleanor Countess Peel	Scottish Borders	102,871,973	80	82,297,579
15	1948	TRH Gerald Berkeley	Lincolnshire	105,111,626	77	80,935,952

Notes: 2015 prices. "TRH" = "The Right Honourable". * 2nd Duke of Westminster. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 1: The 15 Largest Taxpayers, 1892-1992

Table 2: English Surname Extinction, 1881-2001

N Range, 1881	N, Surnames	N, 1881	N, 2001	Prop. Extinct	Ratio
1	1,791	1,791	38,330	0.15	21.40
2-5	3,442	10,151	80,365	0.14	7.92
5-10	5,212	36,103	142,200	0.10	3.94
10-20	7,402	104,419	269,520	0.07	2.58
20-50	11,306	363,995	675,159	0.05	1.85
50-100	7,566	532,791	928,219	0.02	1.74
500-2,000	3,734	3,557,709	6,278,178	0.00	1.76
>2,000	1,680	13,607,051	24,335,967	0.00	1.79

Note: Calculated from the 1881 census (Schurer and Woollard, and National Statistics)

Table 3: English Surname Extinction, 1881-2001, Victorian Elite Dynasties

N Range, 1881	N, Surnames	N, 1881	N, 2001	Prop. Extinct	Ratio
2-5	26	93	539	0.08	5.80
5-10	68	458	2,054	0.12	4.48
10-20	173	2,525	5,866	0.07	2.32
20-50	542	18,547	32,733	0.03	1.76
50-100	691	50,295	84,922	0.00	1.69

Note: Calculated from the 1881 census (Schurer and Woollard, and National Statistics)

Name	Variable	Source	Eq.
<i>Directly Observed</i>			
‘True’ Lineage Wealth	W	Probate Valuations 1892-1920	
Death Taxes	T^D	IR Tables, Figure 13	
Asset Portfolios, by Wealth [†]	E^w, B^w, H^w, C^w, O^w	Inland Revenue, 1908–1990	
Reported Wealth	$W^{obs} = (1 - \alpha)W$	Probate Valuations 1920-92	
<i>Taken from Other Studies</i>			
Return on K , by Asset Classes [†]	r^E, r^B, r^H, r^C, r^O	Jorda et al., ‘Rates’	
Tax on K income	T^K	Piketty, ‘Capital’	
<i>Calculated</i>			
Return on K , by Wealth [†]	r^w	$E^w * r^E + B^w * r^B +$ $H^w * r^H + C^w * r^C + O^w * r$	1
Net return on K	r^{net}	$r^w - T^K$	3
Taxes Paid	T^p	$T^D(1 - \alpha)W$	6
Expected Wealth	W^*	$(1 - \alpha)W(1 + r^{net})$	2
Hidden Wealth	HW	$[W^* - (W^{obs} + T^p)] > 0$	7
New Wealth	$-HW$	$(W^{obs} + T^p) - W^* < 0$	8
‘True’ Wealth, Inheritors	W	$W^* - T^p$	9
‘True’ Wealth, Non-Inheritors	W	$\frac{1}{1-\alpha}W^{obs}$	10
Proportion Hidden	α	HW/W	11

Notes: Estimated for rare surname j and time t (subscripts omitted from table for simplicity). Summary terms for illustration, see text for detailed equations. [†] E are equities, B are bonds, H is housing, C is cash and O is other.

Table 4: Summary Table of Sources, Identities and equations for Estimating Lineage Wealth

Table 5: Hidden Wealth and the Propensity to Hide, the Victorian Rare Elite, England 1920-1990

Decade	'True' Wealth	Observed Wealth	Observed + Paid in Inheritance Tax	Hidden Wealth	Prop. Hidden
1920	2,142	2,035	2,102	40	0.019
1930	2,807	2,787	3,036	-230	-0.082
1940	2,919	2,379	2,816	103	0.035
1950	2,826	1,242	1,826	1,000	0.354
1960	2,931	1,377	2,106	825	0.282
1970	3,035	962	1,858	1,177	0.388
1980-92	4,779	1,795	3,420	1,359	0.284

Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. *Source:* 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 6: Summary Statistics, Rare Surname Level

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Generation	56,763	2	.82	1	2	3
N, Probated	56,763	7.70	8.20	0	5	149
N, 2002	56,763	78.92	72.84	0	58	597
Inferred Wealth	56,763	.70	2.41	0	.14	142.13
Observed Wealth	56,763	.87	5.94	0	.35	1,269.79
Tax Paid	56,763	.21	3.82	0	.02	663.72
Hidden Wealth	56,763	-.31	6.13	-1,269.79	-.11	124.08
Hidden Wealth (>0)	56,763	.29	1.72	0	0	124
Proportion Hidden	56,763	-.32	.66	-1	-.5	1
Proportion Hidden (>0)	56,763	.16	.30	0	0	1
Hide Any Wealth	56,763	.27	.45	0	0	1
Victorian Elite	56,763	.08	.27	0	0	1
In Paradise Leaks	18,921	.12	.32	0	0	1
N, Paradise	18,921	.68	2.67	0	0	35

Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. *Source:* 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 7: Mean Proportion of Wealth Hidden, Surname Level

Inferred Wealth Percentile	Generation			N
	1920-50	1950-80	1980-92	
.0	.12	.13	.04	5,631
.1	.18	.12	.06	5,630
.2	.21	.12	.06	5,630
.3	.20	.14	.07	5,630
.4	.22	.14	.07	5,630
.5	.23	.15	.07	5,631
.6	.25	.15	.08	5,630
.7	.27	.18	.12	5,630
.8	.34	.29	.13	5,630
.9	.25	.30	.10	2,816
.95	.19	.29	.19	2,251
.99	.24	.57	.51	508
.999	.20	.83	.55	57

Note: Negative hidden wealth is set at zero. *Source:* 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 8: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence in the Paradise Papers

	Paradise Dummy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80	1.068 [.828]	1.039 [.491]	1.061 [.752]	1.072 [.882]	1.071 [.867]
80-90	1.118 [1.419]	1.083 [1.028]	1.112 [1.351]	1.121 [1.452]	1.121 [1.450]
The Top 10%	1.407 [4.448]***	1.351 [3.963]***	1.396 [4.339]***	1.404 [4.416]***	1.409 [4.466]***
D_{Hider}	1.258 [3.506]***				
Hidden Wealth		1.034 [2.306]*			
$HW: 0-.2m$			1.108 [.970]		
$HW: .2m-1m$			1.290 [2.692]**		
$HW:>1m$			1.435 [3.078]**		
Prop. Hidden, α				1.401 [3.343]***	
$\alpha: 0-.5$					1.218 [2.097]*
$\alpha .5-.75$					1.270 [2.052]*
$\alpha. 75-.9$					1.277 [1.732]
$\alpha>.90$					1.339 [1.923]
N_{2002}	1.004 [13.100]***	1.004 [12.941]***	1.004 [13.110]***	1.004 [13.078]***	1.004 [13.102]***
Observations	15,975	15,975	15,975	15,975	15,975
Log Likelihood	-5,705.466	-5,708.970	-5,703.947	-5,706.070	-5,705.303
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,422.930	11,429.940	11,423.890	11,424.140	11,428.610

Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow
No hidden wealth and $\alpha = 0$ are the omitted categories
Hidden wealth is calculated 1980-92, estimated via logistic regression
Odds Ratios are reported with t-stats in parantheses

Table 9: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of House Price in 1999

	House Price				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80	14.9 (7.6)	12.2 (7.6)	13.6 (7.6)	15.9* (7.7)	15.6* (7.7)
80-90	48.0*** (7.8)	44.6*** (7.8)	46.6*** (7.8)	48.7*** (7.9)	48.5*** (7.9)
The Top 10%	93.8*** (8.2)	88.4*** (8.2)	91.7*** (8.2)	93.8*** (8.2)	94.1*** (8.2)
D_{Hider}	37.7*** (6.3)				
Hidden Wealth		10.5*** (1.9)			
$HW: 0-.2m$			1.8 (9.8)		
$HW: .2m-1m$			43.1*** (9.4)		
$HW:>1m$			86.6*** (12.5)		
Prop. Hidden, α				59.0*** (9.9)	
$\alpha: 0-.5$					24.1** (9.3)
$\alpha .5-.75$					56.8*** (11.5)
$\alpha. 75-.9$					50.1*** (14.1)
$\alpha> .90$					27.9 (15.3)
N_{2002}	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)
Observations	18,126	18,126	18,126	18,126	18,126
R^2	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02

Note:

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow
House Prices are in Thousands of 2018 Pounds
No hidden wealth, $\alpha = 0$ are the
omitted categories, OLS

Table 10: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Oxbridge Attendance Rate 1990-2016

	Oxbridge Attendance Rate (Z)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80	.100*** (.022)	.095*** (.022)	.097*** (.022)	.103*** (.022)	.103*** (.022)
80-90	.116*** (.023)	.111*** (.023)	.113*** (.023)	.118*** (.023)	.118*** (.023)
The Top 10%	.263*** (.024)	.253*** (.024)	.259*** (.024)	.264*** (.024)	.264*** (.024)
D_{Hider}	.068*** (.018)				
Hidden Wealth		.028*** (.005)			
$HW: 0-.2m$			-.022 (.028)		
$HW: .2m-1m$.092*** (.027)		
$HW: >1m$.175*** (.036)		
Prop. Hidden, α				.115*** (.028)	
$\alpha: 0-.5$.030 (.027)
$\alpha .5-.75$.120*** (.033)
$\alpha. 75-.9$.079* (.040)
$\alpha >.90$.072 (.044)
N_{2002}	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)
Observations	18,921	18,921	18,921	18,921	18,921
R^2	.041	.042	.042	.042	.042

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow.
No hidden wealth, $\alpha = 0$ are the omitted categories, OLS

Supplementary Material

This appendix document provides extra background and empirical detail for the article: Cummins, Neil. ‘The Hidden Wealth of English Dynasties, 1892-2016’, *Economic History Review*.

A Background and Source Material

Figure 12 provides the broad empirical context for the study. Figure 13 reports the range of death duties by wealth level, 1892-2016. Figure 14 is a image of an example table from the from the 1920 report of the *Commissioners of His Majesty’s Inland Revenue* showing the Composition of Wealth-at-Death by Asset Type. Figure 15 plots the employed real rates of return on equity, housing, bonds, bills and capital from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, ‘Rate of return’.




Figure 12: Four Elements in The 'Great Equalization' of English Wealth

Source: a,b: Cummins (2019b). c: Piketty Figure 6.3 (Data on the rate of return to capital available from <http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2>), and GDP per capita from the Maddison Project (<http://www.ggd.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>). Both rates are 'Real' (see Piketty p.209-11 on this point). d: Maximum inheritance tax plotted (HM Revenue & Customs (2005)).

The current narrative: The wealth share of the top 1%, reported in figure 12a, declined because the rate of growth of the economy was greater than the real rate-of-return on capital (12c), net of war-time and taxes (estate taxes are illustrated for example, 12d). In other words, new wealth created by economic growth ('popular wealth' reported in 12b) grew faster than *net* returns on capital (Piketty, (2014), p.362-3).




Figure 13: Death Duties, 1892-2015

Notes: £2015. Inspired by similar figure in Nicholas, (1999). *Source:* HM Revenue & Customs (2005) and Institute for Fiscal Studies, (2007).

Principal Descriptions of Property in respect of which Estate Duty was paid in the Nine Months ended 31st March, 1920.

Household Goods, China, &c.	Land.	House Property and Business Premises.	Ground Rents, &c.	Mines, Minerals, and Quarries.	Other Property.		Total Gross Capital Values.	Total Deductions.	Total Net Capital Values.
					Personalty.	Realty.			
£ 432,452	£ 333,774	£ 560,161	£ 668	£ 102	£ 102,325	£ 453	£ 4,218,447	£ 553,750	£ 3,664,697
431,527	290,944	918,177	1,183	71	178,580	540	4,469,554	194,239	4,275,315
1,009,144	939,023	4,984,591	32,909	710	821,068	87,059	16,156,678	3,837,068	12,319,610
2,644,973	2,208,607	12,491,337	161,038	9,479	5,104,816	198,329	57,410,410	6,151,684	51,258,726
1,125,996	1,421,829	6,085,089	187,402	7,228	1,663,926	132,227	32,431,583	2,597,167	29,834,421
781,841	1,196,194	4,185,729	136,628	8,168	1,156,900	136,245	23,243,513	1,898,098	21,345,415
494,343	772,682	1,869,954	55,517	—	697,688	141,201	14,090,733	1,157,800	12,932,933
391,603	1,100,972	2,244,331	126,194	39,066	899,909	220,662	15,030,643	1,674,420	14,066,223
311,797	383,337	1,168,905	60,130	12,687	476,385	35,270	8,593,550	609,381	7,984,169
467,742	664,242	1,258,433	142,691	25,289	403,673	134,183	12,429,044	822,918	11,606,126
395,292	1,209,643	1,922,704	128,654	10,673	413,484	75,704	13,110,511	880,027	12,230,484
273,970	909,489	713,878	45,062	12,224	503,259	24,031	8,065,455	568,082	7,497,373
468,484	1,607,265	2,667,737	113,635	23,881	880,144	166,494	15,076,386	900,497	14,175,889
333,932	1,245,946	1,493,774	309,893	39,998	298,031	69,297	11,410,709	592,835	10,817,874
300,112	1,804,031	2,138,581	227,176	98,694	—	23,276*	16,307,746	1,136,133	15,231,613
480,880	2,040,584	1,845,010	290,890	38,059	185,885	110,882	15,373,474	1,255,715	14,117,759
183,998	1,133,663	1,003,164	124,518	235,606	332,459	182,608	8,235,595	808,004	7,427,591
103,901	687,910	785,016	93,572	47,982	632,643	8,820	5,874,899	206,043	5,668,856
327,012	2,209,823	1,482,693	90,029	3,852	1,269,598	167,803	13,695,646	712,421	12,983,225
286,357	661,699	636,318	138,843	62,006	—	355,477*	8,494,963	640,246	7,854,717
63,144	696,636	512,154	2,616	16,975	—	774,694*	3,645,471	300,778	3,344,693
180,476	354,286	266,807	100,859	—	788,153	85,381	8,237,985	1,122,767	7,115,218
405,985	482,568	181,176	2,182	18,813	136,146	2,782	3,073,532	165,502	2,908,030
180,034	1,771,784	1,739,485	43,466	6,558	135,747	33,224	9,881,600	314,724	9,566,876
9,227	459,187	459,772	23	145,500	15,959	198	5,440,927	243,166	5,200,761
66,484	25,857	36,583	8,210	824	80,421	2,034	794,007	131,097	662,910
—	—	—	—	—	1,286,395	—	1,286,690	—	1,286,690
12,164,906	26,190,038	52,737,908	2,533,158	860,922	17,555,732	2,133,696	336,029,346	28,535,782	307,503,564
3-62	7-79	15-70	0-75	0-26	5-17	0-64	100-00	8-49	91-51

TABLE 17.—Classification, for the United Kingdom, of the Gross Capital Values of the Months ended

Class.	Government and Municipal Securities.	Stocks, Shares, &c., of Joint Stock Companies.	Cash.	Money lent on Mortgages, Bonds, Bills, &c.	Trade Assets.	Policies of Insurance.
Small Estates, not exceeding £500 gross value	£ 438,129	£ 175,212	£ 1,245,304	£ 257,948	£ 180,173	£ 431,688
Small Estates, exceeding £500, but not exceeding £500 gross value.	555,764	259,771	1,003,313	275,945	244,023	309,726
Exceeding £500 but not exceeding £1,000	1,736,433	1,270,598	2,262,491	962,695	1,142,367	885,900
" " " " " " " "	8,202,880	9,303,610	5,942,657	4,582,766	3,794,083	2,355,829
" " " " " " " "	5,426,159	7,968,497	2,501,264	2,919,985	2,244,387	1,150,309
" " " " " " " "	4,231,065	6,922,655	1,338,703	1,742,640	1,183,579	763,666
" " " " " " " "	2,722,461	4,566,668	753,559	966,405	670,543	382,875
" " " " " " " "	2,404,780	4,270,263	844,343	1,145,942	743,418	489,260
" " " " " " " "	1,439,632	2,318,716	429,271	618,380	428,221	310,798
" " " " " " " "	2,428,811	4,313,435	563,815	697,984	642,015	187,431
" " " " " " " "	2,107,050	4,223,938	647,370	1,111,254	553,599	311,846
" " " " " " " "	1,653,485	2,850,350	369,653	764,327	253,084	82,622
" " " " " " " "	2,894,232	4,401,853	484,843	1,121,071	593,007	298,735
" " " " " " " "	1,844,495	4,190,662	405,446	646,917	276,823	265,862
" " " " " " " "	3,040,335	6,359,272	362,182	864,144	687,176	420,580
" " " " " " " "	3,054,870	5,222,964	622,476	856,414	649,818	265,042
" " " " " " " "	1,468,336	2,650,088	348,027	154,778	216,999	218,381
" " " " " " " "	1,248,836	1,879,309	755,548*	274,100	228,801	9,957
" " " " " " " "	1,843,112	4,035,044	499,066	546,176	443,751	87,777
" " " " " " " "	1,633,207	3,830,511	204,477	617,117	813,242	107,803
" " " " " " " "	429,729	2,201,973	70,021	264,335	10,038	45,055
" " " " " " " "	1,175,655	4,457,454	376,005	188,648	123,631	160,245
" " " " " " " "	466,228	627,203	469,905	202,261	18,206	47,974
" " " " " " " "	1,146,310	3,297,149	292,720	227,887	1,045,768	43,369
" " " " " " " "	517,469	2,904,655	805,021	10,169	87,478	34,070
" " " " " " " "	407,258	35,254	111,091	4,047	47,415	—
" " " " " " " "	—	2,149	—	755	—	7,391
Total	£ 56,646,865	£ 95,786,248	£ 20,729,090	£ 31,974,090	£ 17,262,864	£ 9,630,818
Per cent.	76-26	28-50	6-76	6-54	5-14	2-87

* Capital transferred to other classes exceeded that brought into this class.

Figure 14: Table 17 from the 1920 report of the Commissioners of His Majesty's Inland Revenue showing the Composition of Wealth-at-Death by Asset Type




Figure 15: The Real Rate of Return on Equity, Housing, Bonds, Bills and Capital

Notes: I apply a 11 year moving average to the annual data. *Source:* Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) (website). I interpolate housing returns 1940-5, as Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019).

B The Composition of Wealth

As detailed in section II, I extracted breakdowns of wealth-at-death by asset type from the annual reports of the commissioners of *His Majesty's Inland Revenue* (after 1952, *Her Majesty's*), from ProQuest, (2018). After 1968 in *Inland Revenue Statistics* Her Majesty's Stationery Office, (1970–1992). Table 11 reports the details of which specific asset class was assigned to broad class, for use in the analysis.

Year	Broad Class	Inland Revenue Description
1906	Equity Govt Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	Stocks, Funds, Shares, and other like Securities Money lent on Mortgages, Bonds, Bills, etc. Cash in the House and in Bank Agricultural Land Trade Assets, i.e., Book Debts, Stock, Goodwill, etc.
1910-5	Equity Govt Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	Stocks, Funds, Shares, and other like Securities Money lent on Mortgages, Bonds, Bills, See Cash in the House and in Bank Agricultural Land Trade Assets, Book Debts, Stock, Goodwill etc.
1915-20	Equity Govt Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	Stocks, Funds, Shares, and other like Securities Money Lent on Mortgages, Bonds, Bills, etc. Cash in the House and in Bank Agricultural Land Trade Assets, i.e., Book Debts, Stock, Goodwill, etc.
1925-49	Equity Govt Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	Stocks, Shares, Ac. of Joint Stock, Companies Government and Municipal Securities: British Government Securities issued since 1914 Cash in the House and in Bank Land Trade Assets
1956	Equity Govt Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	Stocks, shares, etc. Private British companies Government and municipal securities British Cash Land Trade assets
1956-1960	Equity Govt Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	Stocks, shares, etc. Private British companies Government and municipal securities British Cash Land Trade assets
1968	Equity	Shares : British, unquoted Ordinary
1981-1990	Govt. Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	National Savings Certs. and Premium Bonds Household goods etc. Land Policies of insurance
	Equity	Overseas and Foreign Securitis
	Govt. Bonds and Bills Cash Housing Other	UK Govt and Municipal Securities Household goods UK residential buildings Superannuation benefits
	Cash	Household goods etc.
	Housing	Land
	Other	Policies of insurance
	Equity	Shares : Preference, debentures
	Govt. Bonds and Bills	Defence and Development Bonds and Tax Reserve Certs
	Cash	Cash in the house
	Housing	Residential buildings
	Other	Trade assets and share of partnership
	Equity	Unlisted UK company securities
	Govt. Bonds and Bills	Loans mortgages etc
	Cash	Other UK buildings
	Housing	Policies of insurance
	Other	UK land
	Equity	Shares : Ordinary shares, Others
	Govt. Bonds and Bills	Shares: and debentures in companies British, quoted trusts Ordinary shares, investment trusts
	Cash	Cash at the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks
	Housing	Other realty
	Other	Other personality
	Equity	Listed UK company securities
	Govt. Bonds and Bills	UK land
	Cash	Trade assets and shares in partnerships
	Housing	Mortgages
	Other	Other Personality/Foreign immovables

Table 11: Allocation of Asset Types to Broad Categories

Notes: This table reports the assignment of specific asset classes, listed in *His Majesty's Inland Revenue* (after 1952, *Her Majesty's*), from ProQuest, (2018) and *Inland Revenue Statistics Her Majesty's Stationery Office*, (1970-1992), to broad asset classes.

C Alternative Estimates using Alternative Rates of Return on Capital

The main analysis uses estimates of the rate of return from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) for different wealth groups. Here I present alternative results using different rates of return on capital. In place of variable rates of return calculated using the observed composition of wealth matched to asset classes from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) (see section II), I substitute the aggregate rate of return on wealth from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) and separately, an alternative aggregate rate of return on capital from Piketty, (2014). The different time-trends of r are plotted in figure 16. Firstly I use the aggregate rate of return on wealth (r) for the UK 1896-2015 from Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) (website). They calculate r as a weighted average of bonds, bills, equity, and housing returns. For 1892-5, I use the average r 1896-1899. As in the main analysis, this annual return on wealth reflects both capital gains and yields, so I transform r to decadal moving averages, centered on the year of death of the decedent. The goal here is to use r to best-guess the rate of growth of inherited fortunes; an individual's financial assets are unlikely to be liquidated annually, so a decadal moving average gives a more realistic estimate of the likely gains or losses to the inheritance. Piketty, (2014) reports decadal values from 1770 to 2010 for the 'Pure rate of return (estimate)' to capital. These values are calculated from the capital share in national income accounts divided by an estimate for national capital stock. Piketty, adjusts these numbers downwards to account for the cost of managing wealth to obtain a 'pure' return on capital, plotted in figure 16 (2014, p.205). (The underlying data for these estimates reported in Piketty, comes from Piketty/Zucman, 2014 and Allen, 2007.)

As plotted in figure 16, the estimates for the 'pure' rate of return on capital by Piketty, (2014) report positive returns for the war years and significantly lower returns after 1975 or so, than the series used in the paper by Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019). The expected wealth of dynasties is calculated exactly as before (as described in section III), apart from the explicit adjustment for the wealth destruction of World War II. As figure 16 illustrates, the Piketty series does not incorporate wartime capital losses. I therefore apply the observed destruction of wealth, by dynastic wealth grouping, to the expected wealth of dynasties, as reported in in table 16.

Here I replicate table 5 which reports the estimated amount of hidden wealth for the Victorian Elite lineages for the two alternative r series. Table 12 reports this alternative set of estimates for the aggregate Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) series. Estimates using Piketty's series for the return on capital are reported in table 13.

The substitution of aggregate rates of return in place of variable (by wealth group) rates of returns results in significantly lower estimates of hidden wealth. The Piketty series generates lower estimates of hidden wealth but there are some interesting differences. Similar to the estimates using Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019), the alternative r estimates a proportion of hidden wealth close to zero in the 1920s, negative hidden wealth in the 1930s and 40s, broadly similar but lower levels for the 1950s, 60s and 70s and estimates zero wealth for 1980-92. Recall, that the estimate of hidden wealth proposed by this paper is a cautious minimum, not a precise spot estimate. As the Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019) directly estimate the rate of return on wealth, they are preferred.

Table 14 presents the regression results from tables 8, 9 and 10 with those using the alternative estimates of r . Despite the fact that the three series produce very different estimated levels of




Figure 16: Estimates of Rate of Return to Wealth or Capital, Jorda et al. 2019 and Piketty 2014
Source: Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick and Taylor, (2019), website. (For 1892 to 1895, I use the 1896 value.) Piketty, (2014): <http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/xls/>, spreadsheet Chapter6TablesFigures.xlsx. sheet “TS6.1”.

aggregate hidden wealth, the choice of r does not materially affect the significance nor magnitude of any of the contemporary outcome correlations, at the surname level.

Table 12: Hidden Wealth and the Propensity to Hide, the Victorian Rare Elite, England 1920-1990, using Jorda (2019) aggregate rate of return on capital

Decade	‘True’ Wealth	Observed Wealth	Observed + Paid in Inheritance Tax	Hidden Wealth	Prop. Hidden
1920	2,203	2,035	2,102	100	0.046
1930	2,894	2,787	3,040	-147	-0.051
1940	2,597	2,379	2,771	-174	-0.067
1950	2,106	1,242	1,714	392	0.186
1960	2,189	1,377	1,990	199	0.091
1970	2,292	962	1,748	544	0.237
1980-92	3,845	1,798	3,298	547	0.142

Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. *Source:* 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 13: Hidden Wealth and the Propensity to Hide, the Victorian Rare Elite, England 1920-1990, Using Piketty (2014) rate of return on capital

Decade	‘True’ Wealth	Observed Wealth	Observed + Paid in Inheritance Tax	Hidden Wealth	Prop. Hidden
1920	2,222	2,045	2,110	112	0.050
1930	2,675	2,801	3,043	-368	-0.138
1940	2,055	2,380	2,831	-776	-0.378
1950	2,102	1,242	1,867	235	0.112
1960	2,214	1,377	2,158	56	0.025
1970	2,301	962	1,917	384	0.167
1980-92	3,292	1,796	3,323	-31	-0.009

Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. *Source:* 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 14: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence in the Paradise Papers and Contemporary Outcomes, comparison using alternative r

	<i>logistic</i>		<i>OLS</i>		<i>OLS</i>	
	Paradise Dummy		House Price		Oxbridge Rate	
	Odds Ratio		000s of Pounds		Z-Score	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>J</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>P</i>
Wealth Percentile: 70-80	1.065*** (.079)	1.054*** (.080)	21.364** (7.645)	16.144* (7.646)	.089*** (.022)	.108*** (.022)
80-90	1.128*** (.079)	1.117*** (.079)	43.498*** (7.859)	47.630*** (7.856)	.119*** (.023)	.125*** (.023)
The Top 10%	1.412*** (.077)	1.383*** (.077)	94.087*** (8.241)	93.928*** (8.240)	.255*** (.024)	.265*** (.024)
D_{Hider}	1.235*** (.068)	1.250*** (.070)	40.104*** (6.580)	37.704*** (6.780)	.065*** (.019)	.076*** (.019)
N_{2002}	1.004*** (.0003)	1.004*** (.0003)	-.565*** (.035)	-.566*** (.035)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)
Observations	15,975	15,975	18,126	18,126	18,921	18,921
R ²			.018	.018	.041	.042

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

J uses Jorda et al. (2019) r series

P uses Piketty et al. (2014) r series

No hidden wealth is the omitted category

Oxbridge Rate is Z-Score

House Prices are in Thousands of 2018 Pounds

D Wartime Destruction of Dynastic Wealth

To estimate the destruction of capital due to the World Wars I look at the sum of rare dynastic wealth in the 5 years before and after the wars. Wartime destruction, w_d of wealth, W , for surname j is calculated as

$$W_{wd} = \frac{\sum_{t=WarStart-5}^{WarStart} w_{jt} - \sum_{t=WarEnd}^{WarEnd+5} w_{jt}}{\sum_{t=WarStart-5}^{WarStart} w_{jt}} \quad (16)$$

where $WarStart$ is the start year of the war (either 1918 or 1939) and $WarEnd$ is the end of the war (1918 or 1945). This will be an imperfect measure of the true wealth destruction of the war: Younger deaths during war will give the appearance of larger wealth destruction because of lost life-course wealth accumulation. Acting against this will be the reduced possibility to move wealth around to avoid the taxation of bequests. For simplicity, I take the simple ratio of equation 16.

Tables 15 and 16 report the wartime destruction of English wealth, calculated as in equation 16 for all, and the dynasty groupings. Wartime wealth destruction is far greater in World War I than World War II, 38% versus 16% respectively. However, the lineage analysis reveals that this destruction is entirely limited to the pre-war elites. Nearly 60% of Victorian Elite dynastic wealth is wiped out during the Great War. The middling and bottom lineages get richer after the war.

World War II also sees more destruction of Victorian elite wealth but this time it is about half as damaging at 26%. Further, the Second World War was more egalitarian in its wealth destruction and thus less of an equalizing force than the Great War, at least as far as this dynastic evidence suggests.

Table 15: Wartime Destruction of Wealth, World War I

Victorian Wealth	Pre-War Wealth	Post-War Wealth	Prop. Destroyed	N	N, Lineages
All	63,987	39,532	0.382	342,614	34,259
Elites	2,148	891	0.585	2,395	990
Middling	35	56	-0.590	894	570
Bottom	13	109	-7.285	1,643	1,261

Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. *Source:* 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 16: Wartime Destruction of Wealth, World War II

Victorian Wealth	Pre-War Wealth	Post-War Wealth	Prop. Destroyed	N	N, Lineages
All	90,516	76,019	0.160	623,136	53,181
Elites	1,501	1,111	0.259	4,521	1,153
Middling	213	187	0.123	2,639	996
Bottom	314	316	-0.007	5,285	2,514

Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

E Extra Results

Figure 17 illustrates how newly created wealth is captured. Table 17 lists the top 50 dynasties, their hidden wealth, their propensity to hide, the number of them living in the UK in 2002, whether presence is recorded in the *Offshore Leaks Database* and whether they were members of the Victorian Elite, as defined in the paper. Figure 18 reports three series: estimated lineage wealth (equation 2), observed wealth $((1 - \alpha)W)$ and observed wealth plus taxes paid (T^p), accumulating at r^{net} , for the middle ranking Victorian Lineages, 1920-1992. Table 18 reports the correlation of estimated wealth and observed wealth for the Victorian Elite lineages, 1920-1992. Figure 19 reports the cumulative wealth of a set of random illustrative rare surnames from the PPR Calendar data. Table 19 reports a sample of names found in the *ICIJ Offshore leak database* that have surnames that are designated as possessing significant amounts of hidden wealth by this analysis. Table 20 reports an OLS estimation of the probability of appearance in the *ICIJ Offshore leak database*, as reported in logistic form in table 8.

E.1 Contemporary Outcome Regressions: Alternative Wealth Controls

The wealth decile dummies used in the regressions in sections V and V, allow for the wealth effect on the probability of a surname's appearance in the paradise papers, it's average post code house price in 1999 and it's Oxbridge attendance, to be non-linear. However, it is possible that this formulation could miss the effect of wealth *within* these deciles. To address this I rerun the regressions using a cubic formulation for wealth as opposed to the decile dummy as detailed in equations 12 and 13. Tables 21 (paradise appearance), 22 (post-code house price in 1999), 23 (Oxbridge attendance), reported here, replicate the regressions reported previously but this time using cubic wealth as opposed to wealth decile dummy variables. The results for all the variables of interest are almost identical.

Table 17: Hidden Wealth by Lineage, the top 50


Surname	Hidden Wealth	α	N_{2002}	$D_{Paradise}$	Victorian Elite
Mxxxxxx	72,514,261	0.994	192	0	1
Txxxxxxxx	48,445,142	0.942	72	0	1
Axxxxxxxx	46,621,369	0.988	81	0	1
Txxxxxxxxxxxx	36,013,097	0.989	28	0	1
Hxxxxxx	31,436,351	0.970	84	0	1
Hxxx	30,823,833	0.935	134	1	1
Pxxxxx	24,991,968	0.997	36	1	1
Exxxxx	22,369,609	0.989	66	0	1
Wxxxxx	21,405,270	0.905	135	0	1
Txxxxx	21,307,370	0.989	75	0	1
Vxxxxx	21,213,447	0.885	35	0	1
Sxxxxxxxx	20,831,656	0.917	244	1	1
Vxxxx	20,196,556	0.910	116	0	1
Axxxxxxxx	17,892,039	0.991	80	0	1
Mxxxxxxxx	17,181,360	0.953	64	0	1
Cxxxxxxxx	16,369,463	0.946	54	0	1
Kxxxxx	16,110,795	0.875	176	1	1
Wxxxxxxxx	15,799,569	0.989	63	0	1
Mxxxxx	15,451,885	0.989	36	0	1
Nxxxxxxxx	15,330,217	0.987	42	1	1
Pxxxx	15,235,053	0.946	85	0	1
Lxxxxxxxx	15,226,656	0.988	93	1	1
Bxxxxxxxx	15,110,489	0.995	91	0	1
Wxxxxxxxxxxxx	14,968,402	0.988	44	0	1
Cxxxx	14,869,081	0.931	180	0	1
Txxxxxx	14,159,725	0.861	10	1	1
Txxxxxxxx	14,082,320	0.999	16	0	1
Hxxxxxx	13,960,525	0.800	7	0	1
Mxxxxxx	13,648,678	0.861	39	0	1
Exxxxxxxx	13,110,603	0.978	61	0	1
Dxxxxxxxx	12,892,546	0.906	145	0	1
Lxxxxxx	12,200,204	0.955	90	0	1
Rxxxxx	12,138,208	0.961	73	0	1
Sxxxxxxxx	11,864,289	0.860	64	0	1
Ixxxx	11,559,095	0.879	198	0	1
Txxxxxx	11,497,707	0.956	74	0	1
Mxxxxxx	10,737,028	0.992	11	1	1
Sxxxxx	10,495,891	0.955	77	1	1
Fxxxxx	10,418,278	0.915	88	0	1
Txxxxxx	10,367,623	0.725	97	0	1
Bxxxx	9,692,158	0.886	46	0	1
Yxxxxxx	9,072,066	0.960	38	1	1
Sxxxxxxxx	8,683,713	0.986	10	0	1
Zxxxxx	8,644,598	0.890	85	1	1
Bxxxxxxxx	8,585,697	0.982	0	0	1
Pxxxxxxxx	8,373,589	0.805	104	0	1
Dxxxxxxxx	8,278,936	0.988	9	0	1
Sxxxxxxxx	8,268,037	0.996	7	0	1
Oxxx	8,197,463	0.959	140	0	1
Sxxxx	8,104,672	0.898	333	0	1

Wealth is in £2015. Names are withheld. Annual flow of £.


Table 18: Observed Wealth as a function of Estimated Wealth, Victorian Elite Lineages

	Observed Wealth		
	1920-49	1950-1984	1985-92
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Estimated Wealth	1.014*** (.033)	.648*** (.012)	.804*** (.029)
Observations	30	35	7
R ²	.971	.989	.992

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
 No Constant, OLS
 Observed Wealth is inclusive
 of inheritance tax paid




(a) Victorian 'Middling' Lineages




(b) Victorian Bottom Lineages

Figure 18: Estimated and Observed Lineage Wealth, with taxes paid, Victorian mid and bottom Lineages


Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.




(a) Cummins's




(b) Comyns's



(c) Xxxxxx's



(d) Axxxx's



(e) Dxxxxxxx's

Figure 19: Example of Lineage Wealth by Rare Surname

Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.

Table 19: Examples of English Lineage Names Found in Paradise Papers

Name	Source	Hidden Lineage Wealth	α	N, 2003	N, Paradise	Victorian Elite
XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX	Paradise Papers - Samoa corporate registry	1,817,835	0.58	209	11	1
XXXXXXXX XXXX X.	Paradise Papers - Barbados corporate registry	17,366	0.16	26	1	0
XXXXXX XXXXX-XXXX	Paradise Papers - Barbados corporate registry	43,661	0.10	202	6	0
XXXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX	Panama Papers Panama Papers	2,323,661 90,745	0.70 0.08	171 172	3 11	1 0
XXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXX XX. XXXXXX XXXXX	Paradise Papers - Malta corporate registry Panama Papers	188,947 71,170	0.74 0.92	32 34	2 1	0 0
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX	Paradise Papers - Barbados corporate registry	258,964	0.36	224	3	0
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX, XXXXX XXXXX	Paradise Papers - Barbados corporate registry Paradise Papers - Aruba corporate registry	258,964 131,995	0.36 0.08	224 110	3 10	0 0

Hidden Wealth is Annual Flow, in 2015 pounds

Table 20: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence in the Paradise Papers

	Paradise Dummy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80	.002 (.008)	-.0002 (.008)	.002 (.008)	.003 (.008)	.003 (.008)
80-90	.007 (.008)	.004 (.008)	.007 (.008)	.007 (.008)	.007 (.008)
The Top 10%	.040*** (.009)	.036*** (.009)	.039*** (.009)	.040*** (.009)	.040*** (.009)
D_{Hider}	.024*** (.007)				
Hidden Wealth		.005* (.002)			
$HW: 0-.2m$.011 (.010)		
$HW: .2m-1m$.026** (.010)		
$HW: >1m$.039** (.013)		
Prop. Hidden, α				.035*** (.010)	
$\alpha: 0-.5$.020* (.010)
$\alpha .5-.75$.025* (.012)
$\alpha. 75-.9$.025 (.015)
$\alpha >.90$.030 (.016)
N_{2002}	.001*** (.00004)	.001*** (.00004)	.001*** (.00004)	.001*** (.00004)	.001*** (.00004)
Constant	.063*** (.004)	.068*** (.004)	.063*** (.004)	.064*** (.004)	.063*** (.004)
Observations	15,975	15,975	15,975	15,975	15,975
R^2	.020	.020	.020	.020	.020

Note:

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow

No hidden wealth and $\alpha = 0$ are the omitted categories

Hidden wealth is calculated 1980-92, estimated via OLS

Standard Errors in parantheses

Table 21: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence in the Paradise Papers, Alternative Wealth Controls

	Paradise Dummy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Observed Wealth	1.129 [3.887]***	1.109 [3.342]***	1.125 [3.758]***	1.130 [3.915]***	1.131 [3.933]***
Observed Wealth Squared	.998 [-1.407]	.999 [-.993]	.998 [-1.314]	.998 [-1.439]	.998 [-1.448]
Observed Wealth Cubed	1.000 [.678]	1.000 [.336]	1.000 [.601]	1.000 [.707]	1.000 [.714]
D_{Hider}	1.263 [3.580]***				
Hidden Wealth		1.035 [2.353]*			
$HW: 0-.2m$			1.118 [1.056]		
$HW: .2m-1m$			1.288 [2.682]**		
$HW:>1m$			1.445 [3.140]**		
Prop. Hidden, α				1.421 [3.491]***	
$\alpha: 0-.5$					1.214 [2.066]*
$\alpha .5-.75$					1.271 [2.063]*
$\alpha. 75-.9$					1.292 [1.815]
$\alpha>.90$					1.371 [2.081]*
N_{2002}	1.004 [13.824]***	1.004 [13.609]***	1.004 [13.826]***	1.004 [13.800]***	1.004 [13.826]***
Observations	15,975	15,975	15,975	15,975	15,975
Log Likelihood	-5,703.779	-5,707.418	-5,702.310	-5,704.160	-5,703.515
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,419.560	11,426.840	11,420.620	11,420.320	11,425.030

Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow
No hidden wealth and $\alpha = 0$ are the omitted categories
Hidden wealth is calculated 1980-92, estimated via logistic regression
Odds Ratios are reported with t-stats in parantheses

Table 22: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of House Price in 1999, Alternative Wealth Controls

	House Price				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Observed Wealth	39.7*** (3.4)	37.4*** (3.4)	38.6*** (3.4)	40.2*** (3.4)	40.0*** (3.4)
Observed Wealth Squared	-1.1*** (.2)	-1.1*** (.2)	-1.1*** (.2)	-1.2*** (.2)	-1.1*** (.2)
Observed Wealth Cubed	.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)
D_{Hider}	37.5*** (6.3)				
Hidden Wealth		10.4*** (1.9)			
$HW: 0-.2m$			3.4 (9.8)		
$HW: .2m-1m$			41.3*** (9.4)		
$HW:>1m$			86.3*** (12.5)		
Prop. Hidden, α				60.8*** (9.9)	
$\alpha: 0-.5$					21.8* (9.3)
$\alpha .5-.75$					55.4*** (11.5)
$\alpha. 75-.9$					51.8*** (14.1)
$\alpha>.90$					33.7* (15.3)
N_{2002}	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)	-.6*** (.03)
Observations	18,126	18,126	18,126	18,126	18,126
R^2	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02

Note:

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow

House Prices are in Thousands of 2018 Pounds

No hidden wealth, $\alpha = 0$ are the

omitted categories, OLS

Table 23: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Oxbridge Attendance Rate 1990-2016, Alternative Wealth Controls

	Oxbridge Attendance Rate (Z)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Observed Wealth	.136*** (.010)	.131*** (.010)	.133*** (.010)	.137*** (.010)	.137*** (.010)
Observed Wealth Squared	-.005*** (.001)	-.005*** (.001)	-.005*** (.001)	-.005*** (.001)	-.005*** (.001)
Observed Wealth Cubed	.00003*** (0.00000)	.00003*** (0.00000)	.00003*** (0.00000)	.00003*** (0.00000)	.00003*** (0.00000)
D_{Hider}	.070*** (.018)				
Hidden Wealth		.028*** (.005)			
$HW: 0-.2m$			-.014 (.028)		
$HW: .2m-1m$.089*** (.027)		
$HW:>1m$.173*** (.036)		
Prop. Hidden, α				.124*** (.028)	
$\alpha: 0-.5$.025 (.027)
$\alpha .5-.75$.117*** (.033)
$\alpha. 75-.9$.086* (.040)
$\alpha>.90$.094* (.044)
N_{2002}	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)	.002*** (.0001)
Observations	18,921	18,921	18,921	18,921	18,921
R^2	.045	.045	.045	.045	.045

Note:

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum flow.
No hidden wealth, $\alpha = 0$ are the
omitted categories, OLS